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PREFACE 
This thesis grew out of a term paper for a Sociology of Development class. An 
important aspect of that class involved the study of the transformation of the agricultural 
sector in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries and more recent changes taking place 
among peasants of developing nations. 
The agricultural section intrigued me. Coming from a Canadian province where 
50 percent of the population still made its living by farming I had some notion of the 
organization of agricultural production in North America. I also was acquainted with the 
agricultural settlement history of the Canadian great plains region. While the family 
farmers I knew certainly differed from the peasants of pre-industrial Europe and of 
today's developing nations they also exhibited some similarities. 
Family farms were what their name implied - farms run by families, not by 
individuals. Like peasant enterprises family farmers relied on the help of all their 
immediate kin to get the work done. Like peasants, family farmers also drew on their 
extended kin network for help during busy times. A farmer could expect, and indeed 
relied on, help from his wife, his siblings and their family members, and from his 
parents, if they were still healthy enough to participate. 
Extended kin help speeded up seeding, harvest, cattle round-ups, and building 
projects. During harvest, for instance, the men handled the machine. work but everyone 
pitched in. The women cooked, brought food to the fields, and operated combines or 
drove grain trucks to the elevator if things got insanely busy. Children old enough to help 
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contributed according to their gender - boys on the machines, girls in the kitchen or 
running errands. 
A farmer's extended kin provided invaluable help. Kin "poverty" translated to 
economic poverty for family farmers. Lack of extended kin help inhibited the family 
farmer's ability to complete crucial work like seeding or harvest in a timely fashion and 
hence lowered his return from his produce, e.g., frost-bitten grain gets the farmer a 
lower grade at the elevator which, in turn, means a lower price. 
At the same time I was reading about peasants and relating them to what I knew 
about family farming the American family farm crisis was in the headlines. While I knew 
Canadian farmers were experiencing economic difficulties their woes didn't seem quite 
as severe as those of American family farmers. The rate of foreclosures in the American 
mid-west eclipsed the economic concerns of Western Canadian grain farmers which still 
centered mainly on freight rates, e.g., the "Crow rate", and low commodities prices. 
Depending on who analyzed the increases in farm foreclosures, they were seen 
either as the result of poor business management on the part of farmers or the 
consequences of an unfair American government agricultural policy that put cheap food 
ahead of the well-being of family farmers. The first line of argument took the tack that 
farm foreclosures, if they weeded out poor managers, provided a boost to the agricultural 
economy since Americans would be left with the most "efficient" producers and not have 
to subsidize "inefficient" farmers. The alternative argument claimed that family farmers, 
because the American government had always relied on a "cheap food policy" to mollify 
consumers and increase agricultural exports, suffered under an unfair agricultural 
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marketing system where they did not receive a fair price for their produce. Furthermore, 
large corporate farmers, not family farmers, received the lion's share of government 
agricultural subsidy payments even though they weren't in need of such help. 
The American farm crisis caught my attention since it contained elements directly 
related to "development". It raised questions of the place of family farmers in advanced, 
capitalist economies. Although I had taken their existence for granted, according to many 
development theoreticians, especially the neo-classical economists and the Marxists, these 
labour units comprised an anomaly in market economies. By any stretch of the 
imagination they should have disappeared years ago, replaced by larger units organized 
completely on for-profit or, depending on your perspective, capitalist principles. 
So I decided to look more closely at American family farmers and especially at 
farm foreclosures. The sociological literature was sparse and speculative. Most of it 
remained at the theoretical level and what empirical work existed concentrated on 
historical developments in the country as a whole. There was little examination of 
existing agricultural census data and, with the exception of Patrick Mooney's research 
on Wisconsin farmers, no in-depth, qualitative work on the situation of American family 
farmers. 
The paper for the development class comprised little more than a literature review 
and an outline of areas in need of research. I chose one of those areas, the lack of in-
depth analysis of regional patterns of development in American agriculture, as the major 
focus of this thesis. I specifically wanted to ascertain if trends in American agriculture 
as a whole since 1920 have been uniform across the country of if there are significant 
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regional variations in the strategies and situations of American family farmers. What 
follows is an examination of agriculture in two American states, North Dakota and 
Illinois, from 1920 to 1987. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Family farmers have been much in the news of late. If one is to believe the 
rhetoric of some American politicians, "the family farm" is a hallowed American 
institution that must be preserved at all costs. However, neither the news reports or the 
politicians ever tell us exactly who family farmers are. Who are we trying to save? Who 
gets classified as a family farmer and why? We need to know what these farmers do and 
how this distinguishes them from other groups who are involved in agriculture, such as 
peasants, plantation agriculturalists, or capitalist agriculturalists. 
Peasants. Family Farmers. and Capitalist Farmers: 
from Subsistence Production to Production for Profit 
American agriculture never went through a "peasant" phase as did agriculture in 
Europe. Rather patterns of landholding and agricultural production have always been 
integrated to a large degree into a market economy (Buttell 1980; Mann and Dickinson 
1980; Vogeler 1977). Three patterns of landholding and agricultural production emerged 
irt the United States. The first was the family farm which was owned and operated by 
one family and was relatively small in size. This type of farm organization still 
characterizes the northern and midwestern states. Plantation agriculture typified the South 
where ownership of large tracts of land resided in the hands of a few who relied on 
slaves for labour power. After the abolition of slavery agriculture in the south moved 
towards a hired labour basis. The southwest exhibited a "capitalist" type of agriculture 
early on in its development. Here large land-owners have always depended on hired 
labour for production. Hispanics and Asians made up a large portion of this farm labour 
pool. Hispanics continue to comprise the bulk of the agricultural labour force in states 
like California, Arizona, and Texas. 
"Classic" peasant agriculturalists, such as existed in Europe during the middle 
ages and still exist in some of the developing nations of the 20th century, produce 
primarily for their own personal consumption with market production a minor concern. 
Peasants, like farmers, operate in a state-controlled political contexts. Although 
researchers often consider peasants an undifferentiated group, there are important 
distinctions within the peasantry centering on ownership of land and level of integration 
into the market (Wolf 1973:xiv). However, for the purposes of this paper it is enough 
to distinguish peasants from farmers. 
The important distinction between peasants and farmers according to Wolf (1973) 
centers on goals. He argues that the major aim of peasants is, "subsistence and social 
status gained within a narrow range of social relationships" whereas farmers, "participate 
fully in the market and ... commit themselves to a status game within a wide social 
network" (1973:xiv). The differences between farmers and peasants blur when peasants 
are drawn into producing more heavily for the market. However, distinctions also need 
to be made when examining farmers in capitalist economies. Just as all peasants are not 
alike, so all farmers are not alike. In market economies like the United States there are 
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at least two types of farmers: family farmers and capitalist farmers. 1 
1 Mooney (1982) makes a good argument for the existence of a third class of farmers he 
calls, "propertied labourers". These farmers own some of their means of production, e.g., land 
and machinery, but they work under contract to large agribusiness corporations who control 
parts of the agricultural production process such as when and what to plant, what chemicals to 
use on the crops, and who the farmer can sell his finished product to. He also identifies "part-
time family farmers" as farm families who fulfill Buttel's requirements of owning some or all 
of their land and who rely on family labour to get the farm work done but who derive half or 
3 
Buttel (1980: 10) defines family labour farms as those enterprises in which the 
agricultural producer, or family, holds formal title to most or all of the land and to the 
capital employed in production. The producer has entrepreneurial control over these 
instruments of production and can dispose of them at his/her discretion. The farm is 
largely, or fully commercial, exchanging commodities for goods on the market and most 
or all of the family's livelihood derives from farm income and farm produced 
commodities. Buttel (1980: 10) labels family farmers in market economies "independent 
commodity producers". Family farming, as defined by Buttel, is an historically rooted 
phenomenon. It represents a form of agricultural production that appeared in Europe after 
feudalism and in Europe's western colonies, the United States, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand. 
Capitalist farmers, like family farmers, own some or all of their land but they 
produce entirely for the market. Capitalist farmers differ from family labour farmers in 
that they rely primarily on hired labour to get their farm work done rather than family 
labour. In addition, capitalist farmers are much more likely to derive considerable income 
from sources not directly connected to the farm, e.g., agricultural service enterprises, 
and to be "vertically integrated" in their operations, meaning they control all phases of 
their production process from the input stage of fertilizer, seed, and other chemical 
additives to the output stage of marketing. 
more of their income from off-farm income, usually in the form of wage labour of the wife, 
husband or both spouses. 
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By the late 1980's many family farmers in the United States were in big financial 
trouble. The rate of farm foreclosures in the had reached proportions rivalling that of the 
1930's. A 1987 journalistic report indicated in that year alone financial institutions 
foreclosed on U.S. farms at the rate of 2000 per week (Pugh 1987:7). The majority of 
these foreclosures were on family farms. At this rate (104,000 per year) family farmers 
are indeed an "endangered species". If the 1987 trend continues the number of family 
farms in the U.S. will decline from the present 1,809,324 to 769,324 by 1997. 
While most see the recent spate of farm foreclosures as unequalled in American 
agriculture the historical record shows decreases in farm numbers are the rule rather than 
the exception. The movement of American farmers off the land is not a phenomena of 
the 1980's but rather an ongoing trend. Farm numbers have been declining ever since 
1935. From 1935 to 1987 the number of farms in the United States decreased by two 
thirds, falling from six and one-half million farms in 1935 to about two million farms in 
1987 (U.S. Census of Agriculture 1935; 1987). This represents a 300 percent decrease 
in 67 years. 
In spite of the declining numbers of family farms, the 198'72 agricultural census 
data showed individual or family farms still dominated U.S. agriculture and constituted 
87 percent of all farms. Still, between 1920 and 1987 the number of farms declined by 
4,360,584, a 68 percent decrease in 67 years. The rate of decrease appears most severe 
between 1954 and 1974 where the decreases between censuses is never less than 13 
percent, and the overall decrease during this period is 52 percent. 
2 1987 is the most recent U.S. agricultural census data available. 
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Although the amount of land in farms has remained relatively constant since 1935 
the average size of farms increased from 148 acres in 1920 to 462 acres in 1987 (U.S. 
Census of Agriculture 1920; 1987). In 1920, one in three Americans lived on farms 
while in 1977 this figure dropped to one in 28, or 3.6 percent of the population (Vogeler 
1981:3). Between 1920 and 1977 net outmigration from farms totalled 48.7 million 
people. 
These rural migrants represent three major groups. The first group is composed 
the children of farmers or small-town residents. Many children of farmers cannot stay 
in rural areas because they do not have enough money or land to begin farming or have 
no other job opportunities in the area. Some of these young people also choose to leave 
the farm for an urban lifestyle. The second group is comprised of retired farmers who 
have either sold their farms or have left them to younger sons. 
The third group represents a growing number of younger farmers. Some of these 
farmers are the ones who are so much in the news today - the victims of farm 
foreclosures. Some others are undoubtedly farmers who finally gave up what they saw 
as a futile attempt to maintain themselves on the land. They "packed it up and moved to 
town 11 , as the saying goes in rural Saskatchewan. 
The current crisis of American family farmers needs to be seen in the context of 
the larger political economy. The growth of U.S. agribusiness since the 19th century and 
the various wars the U.S. has engaged in since the Civil War have had tremendous 
effects on the structure of the agrarian sector. 
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Looking initially at agribusiness, the process of agribusiness encroachment into 
family farming can be divided into three stages (Havens 1985). The first stage, from 
1860 to 1900, consisted of gaining control of the "output" phase of agriculture - the 
marketing and processing of agricultural products. During this period family farmers lost 
control of the marketing of their products because of two developments. First, agrarian 
capitalists and the U.S. government worked together to open national and international 
markets to American agricultural commodities and tied family farmers to world prices 
over which they had little control. Second, the railroad companies and food processing 
companies such as millers, meat-packers, and canneries established themselves as the 
middlemen through which farmers had to market their products nationally. 
The second stage, from 1900 to 1950, involved growing incursions of agribusiness 
into the "input" phase of agriculture. During this period family farmers grew increasingly 
dependent on agribusiness firms for the "raw" materials of farming such as seed, 
fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides and for the "tools of the trade" such as farm machinery. 
Farmers effectively lost control over a significant portion of their means of production. 
It is also during this period that the U.S. federal government most actively encouraged 
farmers to step up agricultural production to meet the wartime needs of Europe during 
WWI and WWII. Farmers responded admirably but had to mechanize to make up for 
increased production demands and the shortage of agricultural labour· occassioned by the 
war. 
From 1950 to the present agribusiness firms have pushed into the actual 
production phase of agriculture. Some firms operate their own production enterprises 
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such as livestock feedlots and chicken farms. Others, especially canneries, engage in 
product contracts in which they supply farmers with inputs like seed and pesticides while 
in return the farmer plants, cultivates, and harvests the crop, selling it to the company 
for an agreed upon price. 
Each of these phases had particular consequences for family farmers. However, 
it is the first two that have led to what is often referred to as the "cost-price squeeze" of 
farming. I want to briefly present the history of this situation as a lens through which 
declining farm numbers should be viewed. I look first at loss of control over outputs 
followed by the loss of control over inputs. 
Losing Control of the Output Phase: 
The Emergence of Markets and Agribusiness Middlemen 
In their historical analyses of U.S. agriculture Havens (1985) and Howe (1982) 
examine farmers loss of control over the marketing of their products. Howe (1982) 
details the consequences of the development of national and international agricultural 
markets had for farmers. Beginning in 1850 the newly developed American rail 
transportation system created a national agricultural market, as opposed to regional 
markets. At the same time developments in the shipping industry allowed large capitalist 
farmers to open up international agricultural markets. For the first time, farmers found 
themselves at the mercy of a large, unpredictable market with no power to affect prices. 
Havens (1985) documents the incursions of capitalist business enterprises into the 
agricultural sphere from the late nineteenth century to the present. In concert with the 
development of unpredictable markets large companies began moving into the processing 
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and marketing stages of agricultural production. Consequently, grain, railway, and food 
processing companies came to mediate between farmers and consumers. As capitalist 
food industries became increasingly concentrated and centralized, farmers had no choice 
but to deal with a few large companies that controlled the markets. 
The above intrusions of capitalists into agriculture has resulted in agricultural 
output industries processing and marketing the vast majority of farm products produced 
today. Agribusiness firms buy from the farmer and significantly affect the price farmers 
get for their produce. The "price" industries include marketing, food processing and 
manufacturing, food wholesaling, and food retailing. These firms also show a high 
degree of centralization. In 1979, 44 companies received 68 per cent of all food 
processing revenues. Likewise, 44 companies received all wholesale and retail food 
distribution revenues (Havens 1985:30). A mere 10 companies received more than 80 
percent of the revenues in cereal grains, dairy products, bakery products, meat, canned 
goods, beer, fruits, and nuts (Havens 1985:30). 
This control of the output phase of agricultural production by "cost" industries is 
not unique to agriculture. Primary industries like mining, lumbering, and fishing 
experience the same loss of control over pricing their products. Farmers, however, have 
also become increasingly dependent on producers of agricultural "inputs". Because of the 
increasingly technical and specialized nature of modem agriculture, farmers rely heavily 
on production inputs such as machinery, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, chemical 
fertilizers, and seed. Farmers' greater dependence on inputs increases their vulnerability 
to a cost-price squeeze. Marxists present evidence suggesting that since the beginning of 
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the 20th century increasing capitalist control of the input phase of agriculture (e.g.) 
machinery, fertilizer, pesticides, etc., of farming has further exacerbated farmers' 
economic condition. 
Losing Control of the Input Phase: 
Mechanization of Farming and Scientific Developments in Production 
Farm input industries supply the technology for modem agriculture such as feed, 
fertilizers, chemicals, seeds, and farm machinery. They determine a large part of the 
farmer's costs of production. From the early 20th century to the present these 
agribusiness inputs have increased in both importance and price and adversely affected 
family farmers. 
Key 19th century inventions in railroad and steamship transportation, and agricultural 
machinery fundamentally affected American agriculture as did the 20th century 
developments of electrical power, automobiles, and the gasoline engine. However, not 
all farmers adopted the new technologies equally quickly or to the same extent. Instead 
these inventions provided a competitive edge to the small numbers of farmers that could 
adopt them at the outset. The "progressive" farms pushed out smaller producers who 
were unable to match the increased productive capacity and cheaper prices of their larger 
rivals (Havens 1985: 10). 
Ehrensaft (1980) and Havens (1985) argue innovations affected small independent 
farm producers in ways similar to the effects of industrial innovations on small 
manufacturers. Those farmers who could afford the mechanical innovations (the 
agricultural capitalists and the wealthier independent farmers) adopted the new 
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technologies and their increased production in turn lowered prices for all. This forced 
poorer farmers to adopt the technology just to stay in business but to do so they had to 
go into debt. 
Those farmers who could not obtain the credit to mechanize tried to compensate by 
increasing their labour time and intensity. Eventually even that was not enough and they 
could no longer make a living by farming. They faced the choice of leaving agriculture 
or falling into rural impoverishment. Many of them left, swelling the ranks of the urban 
labour force. 
The "technological treadmill" initiated in the late 19th continues to influence U.S. 
agriculture. Havens (1985) feels that agricultural innovations whether in the form of 
machinery or chemical inputs, reward wealthier farmers since they are the first to 
innovate and the first to benefit from increased yields. When other farmers adopt the new 
technology overproduction occurs and produces falling prices. Because poorer farmers 
have to go into debt to adopt new technology, the price falls affect them particularly 
severely. They must therefore increase outputs even more to counter the debts, and that, 
in turn, drops prices even further. Only increases in demand, created by a new cycle of 
investment in the economy or a war economy, can increase agricultural commodities 
prices. 
Ehrensaft's (1980) examination of the effect of the gasoline tractor provides a good 
example of the uneven development produced by technological innovations in agriculture. 
Specialized horse-drawn machinery (drill seeders, hinged harrows) had been developed 
by the 1830's but were in limited use until the 1850's. From then on until 1896 
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agricultural prices declined regularly and persistently as production increased and 
surpluses emerged 
The 1880's and 1890's saw the adoption of the gasoline tractor by a small group of 
innovators, presumably wealthy farmers attempting to increase production. From 1896 
to 1914 the demand for .agricultural products expanded as a result of immigration and 
W.W.I. As the price upswing continued, adoption of tractors became widespread, 
increasing from 4,000 in 1911, to 246,000 in 1920, and to 920,000 in 1930 (Ehrensaft 
1980:75). Less wealthy farmers also got tractors in order to compete with the innovators, 
but they missed out on the windfall profits when prices began to fall by 1920. 
However, mechanization was not the only input innovation that adversely affected 
family farmers. The development of agricultural innovations such as pesticides, 
herbicides, chemical fertilizers, hybridization, and cross-breeding also played a part. 
Advances in these products continued throughout the 20th century. Family farmers, 
however, adopted them unevenly with the majority of farmers buying innovations only 
when general economic conditions improved. By 1920 commercial fertilizer was in 
general use and from 1920 to 1930 the number of tractors and combines in use increase 
73 per cent and 93 per cent respectively (Havens 1982:22). 
The 1930's ushered in an array of changes, including cross-breeding in hogs and 
hybrid seed com. But it was not until the economy improved with W.W.11 that new 
machinery, hybrid seeds and petrochemical inputs came into common use. All of these 
led to dramatic increases in production. The new production processes kept food prices 
low and allowed the release of surplus agricultural labour for military service and work 
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in the industrial and service sector (Havens 1985:23). By the 1950's, however, 
commodities prices had declined drastically, forcing more family farmers off the land. 
Over the past four decades these "cost" industries have become highly centralized 
(Martinson and Campbell 1980:230,231). This centralization has reduced competition and 
created astronomical escalations in prices. Between 1967 and 1979 the cost of fertilizer 
increased by 80 percent, gasoline by 300 per cent, machinery and equipment by 120 
percent, and pesticides by 250 percent (Havens 1985:28). Not surprisingly, the most 
highly centralized sectors - herbicides/pesticides and petroleum products - registered the 
greatest increases (Martinson and Campbell 1980:230). 
The squeeze that "cost" industries and "price" industries place on farmers has 
intensified because some agribusiness companies have vertically integrated to control all 
phases of the agricultural production process. The Cargill grain company provides an 
example of vertical integration that combines both input and output phases. Cargill not 
only markets grain for American and Canadian farmers but sells them seed, fertilizers, 
pesticides, and herbicides as well (Mitchell 1972:48). Campbell's and Green Giant have 
united crop production, processing, and marketing activities They not only process and 
market vegetables but also engage in part of the crop production via contract farming. 
The company supplies farmers with seed, pesticides, and herbicides. In tum the farmer 
plants, cultivates, and harvests the crop and agrees to sell it only to that company at a 
specified price (Pfeffer 1985a). 
Therefore, the 20th century process of technological innovation which was 
accelerated by two world wars and the Korean War, along with the earlier 19th century 
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loss of market control, due to agrarian and industrial capital accumulation, placed 
American farmers in a highly dependent position. Farmers became caught in a "cost-
price" squeeze between suppliers of farm inputs and the marketers and processors of 
agricultural outputs. The increasingly monopolistic and oligopolistic character of 
agribusiness firms aggravated the squeeze. 
Centralization and concentration in the farm output and input sectors has also 
affected farm incomes negatively and contributed significantly to forcing marginal 
farmers out of business and poorer farmers into debt (Martinson and Campbell 
1980:234). A few agribusiness firms have come to dominate the farm output and input 
sectors. Because of this oligopolistic nature of agribusiness family farmers face a highly 
asymmetric interdependence with markets and are easily exploited by agribusiness. 
Given the relentlessness of the cost-price squeeze it is rather surprising family 
farmers still exist in capitalist economies. While the common perception of the current 
crisis in agriculture is that it is affecting family farmers across the nation in the same 
way there is little data to support this notion. Economic and sociological analyses of the 
crisis tend to rely on gross, national statistics to generalize about farmers in all regions 
of the country. To date there have been no comparisons of the predicament of farmers 
in different regions of the country so it is unclear if some farmers are faring better than 
others. If some are why is this the case, and conversely, if some aren't faring better, 
why not. 
The purpose of this paper is to make just such a comparison and to do so over 
time. I have chosen two states for this analysis, North Dakota and Illinois. While both 
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states are considered "mid-western" they are located in two different ecological zones and 
produce different agricultural commodities. North Dakota is part of the northern great 
plains. It's climate is arid with severely cold winters and dry, hot summers. Except for 
river valley areas the soils are light and highly susceptible to erosion by blowing or run-
off. North Dakota is primarily a wheat and cattle state. In contrast, Illinois is part of the 
long-grass prairie zone. It has a milder climate than North Dakota, the winters are not 
as cold or as long, and the average rainfall is significantly higher. The soils are heavier 
and hence richer and not as subject to degradation by erosion. Illinois farmers 
concentrate their production in com, soybeans, and hogs although the cattle industry has 
been growing in the state since the 1920's. 
A theoretical chapter follows this introduction. It presents the major paradigms 
sociologists use to examine agricultural development in advanced, capitalist economies. 
Three models of agricultural development dominate the sociological literature: an 
explanation closely following the lines of neo-classical economic theory; a traditional 
Marxist explanation; and a "revisionist" Marxist model, a dependency interpretation that 
draws from Chayanovian and more recent anthropological explications of peasant 
agriculture. 
A literature review is included as the third chapter. The fourth chapter, the data 
chapter, presents the regional data I have used to examine the competing explanations of 
the development of American agriculture. I describe the numerical agricultural patterns 
in these regions by looking at numbers of farms, size of farms, tenure of ownership, 
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amount of off-farm work, type of farm organization, and type of farm production in 
terms of agricultural commodities raised. 
In Chapter V, the conclusion, I evaluate the explanatory power of these models. 
My evaluation lies primarily at the "numbers" level, relying on agricultural census data 
to delineate the evolution of agriculture from 1920 to 1987 in North Dakota and Illinois. 
However, I have also drawn on Hiram Drache's interviews with mid-western corporate 
farmers and personal knowledge of my "family farmer" relatives for part of my 
interpretation of the survival strategies of American farmers. 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIV~ ON FAMILY LABOUR FARMS 
IN CAPITALIST ECONOMIES 
In the United States farmers remaining on the land comprise three groups: 
individual farmers, farmers in partnerships, and corporate farmers. While one tends to 
think of partnerships and corporate enterprises as non-family enterprises the agricultural 
census data indicates most partnerships and farm corporations are family "businesses". 
Partnerships generally involve father/son or sibling combinations. Although legally listed 
as corporations, most family farm corporations have less than ten shareholders all of 
whom are related by blood or marriage. 
Sociologists have focused increasing attention on farmers and their economic.and 
social conditions. While much of the recent research has concerned itself with farm 
foreclosures there is a growing body of data on farmers who survive and their strategies 
for survival. Sociologists have used three theoretical models to explain why some farmers 
fail and some survive. Those favouring a neo-classical economic approach write off farm 
failures as examples of poor business management. Conversely they credit farmers who 
survive with superior management skills as well as greater than average initiative and 
foresight. 
Marxist sociologists and economists portray failed farmers as victims of increasing 
monopoly capitalism. In capitalist economies farmers, like other small business people, 
are pushed out by larger enterprises who can produce more cheaply. Marxists believe 
some family farmers will eventually form an agricultural bourgeoisie relying on hired 
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labour while others will enter the ranks of the hired farm labour the new bourgeoisie will 
require. They will become part of the rural proletariat. 
A third group of researchers takes a "bottom up" approach and attempts to explain 
the strategies of family farmers in the context of their particular environmental, 
economic, and social setting. This type of explanation, first advocated by an early 20th 
century Russian agricultural economist, Alexander Chayanov, was revived by 
anthropologists and sociologists studying peasants in developing nations in the 1960's and 
1970's. More recently it has been applied by some rural sociologists to family farmers 
industrialized nations with capitalist economies. 
In this chapter I examine each of these theoretical approaches to farming under 
capitalism economic structures. I begin with the neo-classical economics approach, move 
on to the "traditional" Marxist arguments, and end with a discussion of the more specific 
"Chayanovian" approach. 
"Farmers Mean Business": Neo-Classical Economists' Aru,roaches to Family Farms 
Among most North American agricultural economists, viewing farms as rural 
businesses has dominated the study of family farm organization. All the economic 
categories used for business analysis, i.e., capital, rent, wages - are used in attempts to 
compute farm profits for different sorts of farm organization. In the 1920's agricultural 
economists stated that a farm could not be considered a success unless it met all the 
requirements of a successful business - paying its operating expenses, receiving a current 
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mortgage rate of interest on capital, and receiving a fair return for the farmer's labour 
and management. 
This type of analysis has continued even though then, as now, the data on family 
labour farms does not conform very well to this conceptual mode. Family labour farms 
exhibit clear differences from capitalist farms. For instance, they rely mostly on family 
labour, not hired labour; family labour farmers rarely make what economists would 
consider an "average rate of profit" on their endeavours yet unlike businesses which must 
conform to this "average rate" of profit or face bankruptcy, family labour farms 
generally operate well below this norm or even at a loss and still manage to survive. 
One researcher found that in the three Iowa counties he studied, over one half of 
the farms made nothing for the farmer's labour and failed to make five per cent interest 
on their capital in addition to operating expenses (Durrenberger 1984:6). Yet these farms 
continued to operate. 
Researchers in agricultural colleges have never attempted to explain this 
phenomenon. Plunging ahead with their application of business analysis to farms they 
reasoned that developing and improving agriculture required the same kind of research 
and development as that in industry. Their ultimate goal has been the same as that for 
industry - increased productivity. 
In achieving this goal agricultural colleges have been highly successful. Vast 
supplies of cheap agricultural commodities have become the hallmark of American 
agriculture. However, agricultural economists failed to address the questions of family 
farm organization as it is actually practiced. As such their research has done very little 
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to ensure farmers of an adequate return for their labour, or as it turns out, consumers a 
quality food product for their dollar. 
"Farming as a business" sociologists follow their economics counterparts and 
argue that free enterprise in agriculture without government interference will result in the 
lowest cost, highest-quality products for the consumer (Drache 1976; Vogeler 1981:7). 
They view competition among family farmers as a necessity for fair prices, and in the 
long run as beneficial to farmers since it helps them move up the "agricultural ladder" 
from tenant to part-owner to full-owner by re-investing their "profits" in land and 
equipment. 
Agricultural economists' and sociologists of their persuasion standard explanation 
of those farmers who fail in this type of economy places the blame squarely on the 
individual. Family farmers fail because of their own shortcomings - they are not 
innovative enough, they don't manage efficiently, or they don't work hard enough (c.f., 
Drache 1976, Chapters V, VI, and VII). Those who survive are the most efficient 
producers because they innovate and manage carefully. Because they are efficient they 
produce the most food for the least cost. Most researchers following the neo-classical 
approach assume the continued existence of family farmers under capitalism since free 
competition will supposedly prevent large-scale enterprise from dominating of the 
agricultural sector. 
In opposition to this view of family farmers is that of Marxist economists. Like 
agricultural economists most Marxists categorize family farms as "small businesses" but 
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they predict the ultimate ruin of these small producers as capitalism progresses. It is to 
this explanation of the demise of family farms that I tum next. 
"Dweasantization": Marxist Explanations for the Decline of Family Labour Farms 
Most Marxist explanations of the demise of family farmers simply apply the 
classical Marxian formula for capitalist development to the agricultural sector (Davis 
1980; Ehrensaft 1980; Goss et al. 1980; Lenin 1967). As capitalism progresses and takes 
on more of a monopoly character, they argue, it eventually forces small commodity 
producers, whether they be family farmers, artisans, or other petit bourgeoisie producers, 
into either the proletariat or the bourgeoisie and class polarization becomes complete. 
Again this model comes from an industrial paradigm. Classical Marxists conceive of 
family farmers as no different from small businessmen and therefore expect them to 
suffer the same fate at the hands of larger business enterprises. 
Like the research of western agricultural economists the research of classical 
Marxists rests not on careful fieldwork - sociological, that is - documenting the actual 
economic and social organization of family farms, but on their interpretation of aggregate 
statistical data. This gross data does not reflect regional variations in the situation of 
family farmers, nor does it document the individual strategies farmers adopt to survive 
in a capitalist economy. 
Most of these analyses draw heavily on the conceptual framework established by 
Lenin when he examined Russian agriculture in the late 19th century. A description of 
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Lenin's framework, therefore, subsumes many of the contemporary Marxist theoretical 
approaches to family labour farms in North America. 
Lenin's examination of late 19th century agricultural statistics for Russian 
zemtsvos led him to the conclusion that the mass of the Russian peasantry, like other 
small commodity producers, was losing control over the means of production, i.e., land, 
horses, etc., and being turned into wage labourers while a small number of peasants were 
able to grow larger and eventually transform their family labour farms into capitalist 
enterprises relying primarily on wage labour. 
Lenin, following Marx, argues that the development of commodity production and 
capitalism leads to the social division of labour in which various forms of the processing 
of non-agricultural materials are separated out from agricultural activities. These 
processing activities become independent sectors of industry which exchange their 
products for the products of agriculture. The industrial population begins to grow faster 
than the agricultural population, and many agrarian residents are pulled into the industrial 
sector. 
In capitalist production the basis for the formation of the "home market" - the 
exchange of commodities between different sectors of the economy - is the process of the 
disintegration of small cultivators into either agricultural entrepreneurs or wage workers. 
This Lenin refers to as the "differentiation" of the peasantry. As commodity production 
penetrates further into crop cultivation the competition among agriculturalists - the 
struggle for land and for economic independence - becomes keener and the middle and 
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poor peasants are ousted from their land by the more well-to-do peasants (Lenin 
1967:76). 
Lenin argued that putting the Russian peasant into the situation of commodity 
production completely subordinated peasants to the market, making them dependent on 
it for personal consumption, for farming inputs (machinery, fuel, etc.), for marketing of 
products, and for payment of taxes. In tum, the socio-economic relations of the peasantry 
became subject to all the contradictions inherent in every commodity economy and every 
order of capitalism. 
There was competition, a struggle for economic independence, grabbing of land, 
the concentration of production in the hands of a few and the forcing of the majority into 
the proletariat, and the exploitation of the majority through the medium of the middle-
man (merchant's capital) and the expropriation of surplus-value from workers (hiring of 
farm labourers) (Lenin 1967: 175). Lenin predicted "depeasantization . . . the utter 
dissolution of the old, patriarchal peasantry and the creation of new types of rural 
inhabitants" (1967: 176) as the end result of the economic contradictions in this capitalist 
agricultural economy . 
For Lenin, the starting point of the differentiation process is the emergence of 
property inequality. Differentiation can emerge only when the peasant finds himself in 
a money-rent situation, as opposed to a labour-rent or rent-in-kind situation. With labour-
rent the possibility of differentiation among the peasantry doesn't exist. The peasant owns 
his means of production, working part of the week on his own land and part of the week 
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on the landlord's. The peasant can't acquire much surplus from his production because 
the product from the lord's land goes only to the lord. 
If the peasant pays rent-in-kind he produces the entire product and gives the land-
owner a certain amount of the surplus. But he can acquire a certain surplus over and 
above the amount needed for his necessities. The peasant who acquires more produce can 
have a higher standard of living than his poorer counterpart but since he cannot acquire 
more land with his surplus, differentiation remains at the level of goods only. Although 
this situation holds the seeds of differentiation it can only develop fully with a money-
rent situation. 
Money-rent, in which the peasant substitutes money for rent-in-kind, is possible 
only when commerce, urban industry, and commodity production have developed. These 
conditions transform the traditional common-law relationship between peasant and 
landlord into a cash, contract-based relationship. Money-rent allows those peasants who 
have been able to acquire a significant amount of surplus to buy their land. These more 
prosperous peasants can then exploit agricultural day-labourers for their own profit. In 
this way they can accumulate enough wealth to transform themselves into capitalists. 
Lenin believed differentiation primarily pushes middle-peasants off the land. They 
lose both in class and status as they were forced into urban industries. These peasants 
generally make most of their income in farming but in bad years resort to loans or wage 
work to keep solvent. Every crop failure results in masses of middle peasants seeking 
wage work. The middle peasants fluctuate between the wealthy, would-be-capitalist 
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peasants and the rural proletariat. Only a few of them are lucky enough to make it into 
the ranks of the new rural bourgeoisie; the rest fall into the industrial or rural proletariat. 
The class of capitalist farmers that is created from the wealthy peasants requires 
a larger labour force than the family so they employ landless labourers. The spare cash 
they obtain is either put into commercial operations or usury, or invested in land 
purchases, farm improvements, etc. The small, allotment holding peasants either lose 
their allotment entirely or find it impossible to make a living off pure farming activities. 
They are forced into wage-work for the bulk of their livelihood and become a rural 
proletariat. 
The differentiation of the peasantry creates a home-market for capitalism. There 
is growth in personal consumption among the rural proletariat because they must now 
purchase on the market what they once produced for themselves on their farms. The rural 
bourgeoisie create a market for the means of production, i.e., machinery, and other 
farming inputs, and for personal consumption because their affluence leads to an 
expansion of their personal requirements. 
Although Lenin did not claim to know the rate of differentiation for the Russian 
peasantry or even if differentiation was progressing, he still felt that the general statistics 
on the rural economy at that time supported his view of an uninterrupted and rapidly 
increasing differentiation (Lenin 1967: 185). He argued that the middle peasants were 
abandoning or selling their land and "fleeing" to the towns while the two extreme groups, 
the rural bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat, stayed in the countryside. He predicted 
this reaction in agriculture wherever capitalism became the dominant mode of production. 
Conceptual Inaw,ropriateness of Neo-classical Economic and 
Classical Marxists Approaches to Family Labour Farms 
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Lenin's interpretation, and the interpretations of those who use a similar 
framework for analyzing change in agriculture suffer from the grossness of the data used. 
Agriculture in any country, and especially in large countries like the U.S.S.R., Canada, 
and the U.S.A., is subject to regional variations that produce different economic and 
social strategies among family farmers. The economic conditions of the North American 
wheat belt, for instance, have produced different social and political reactions from 
farmers than have the conditions of the midwestem U.S. com belt. Capitalism does not 
appear to affect these farmers in exactly the same way. At a more elementary level, 
different environmental conditions alone have produced unique coping strategies at both 
the economic and social levels in these areas. 
The other problem with both the Western agricultural economists' explanations 
and the Marxists' explanations of family farmers is their neglect of the family nature of 
the enterprise. The economists classify family farmers purely as businessmen out to make 
a profit. Marxists, although recognizing these units as family labour farms never deal 
with the actual organization of the unit. They prefer, instead, to concentrate on the 
demise of the farmers and what happens when these people are forced out of farming, 
e.g,, the effect of masses of landless rural peasants flocking to urban areas. 
An alternative framework for understanding family labour farms is offered by the 
Chayanovian approach, recently rehabilitated by anthropologists and sociologists studying 
peasants in developing nations. In contrast to both the "farming as a business" approach 
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and the Marxist predictions of the polarization of the peasantry, Chayanov and those 
using his theories, concentrate on the differences between family farming enterprises and 
capitalist farming enterprises. They also recognize the regional variations in the economic 
and social strategies of family labour farmers. 
Chayanov's Understanding of the Family Labour Farm Under Capitalism 
Alexander Chayanov was a Russian economist who, along with his students, 
conducted years of fieldwork with Russian peasants, studying their economic and social 
organization in different regions of the country during the late 19th and early 20th 
century. Chayanov argued that peasants cannot be understood in solely entrepreneurial 
terms or in terms of traditional Marxist class categories. Chayanov began an analysis of 
peasant agriculture from below. He was more interested in delineating the operational 
logic of family farms rather than looking at the national and international flow of 
resources, goods and demands, i.e., how peasants fit into the larger political economy 
(Shanin 1986:3). 
Chayanov classified the peasant farm as a family labour unit. As such it differed 
from typical business enterprises in that it lacked an essential economic category, that of 
wages. In the economic theory of capitalist society the categories of price, capital, 
wages, interest, and rent determine one another and are functionally interdependent. 
But, Chayanov argued, if any one of these categories is absent from an economic unit 
"then all the others lose their specific character and conceptual content and cannot even 
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be defined quantitatively" (1986:4). If an economic structure lacks any one of these 
categories then none of the other categories can be applied to it in their usual meaning. 
Such is the case, argued Chayanov, with the family labour farm. Since it lacks 
the category of wages, it becomes impossible to impose on this structure the other 
categories of net profit, rent, and interest on capital "as real economic categories in the 
capitalist meaning of the work" (Chayanov 1986:5). Rather than making a profit, or 
receiving a loss, from its activities the peasant or artisan family running their own 
"business" receives as a result of a year's work, a gross product, which when exchanged 
on the market, forms the gross product of the economic unit. They subtract outlays on 
materials from the gross product and are left with their labour product. This is, states 
Chayanov, the only possible category of income for family economic enterprises and it 
cannot be broken down either analytically or subjectively. However, family farmers 
suffer a further handicap from family businesses. Unlike family businesses, e.g., family 
stores, etc., many family farmers receive the bulk payment for their year's work annually 
when they sell their crops. 1 
In family enterprises the amount of labour product is mainly determined by the 
size and composition of the working family, the number of its members capable of 
working, the productivity of the labour unit, and the degree of labour effort. Chayanov 
defines the degree of labour effort as " the degree of self-exploitation through which the 
1 The timing and regularity of payments for farm produce differs depending, of course, on 
the type of product. Those farmers most disadvantaged in this respect are cash grain farmers 
who receive their money only after they have harvested their crop. Dairy farmers and mixed 
farmers have a more regular income throughout the year. 
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working members effect a certain quantity of labour units in the course of the year" 
(1986:6). 
The degree of self-exploitation is determined by an equilibrium between family 
demand satisfaction and the "drudgery of labour". Every increase in unit of income is 
evaluated by the family from two viewpoints: first by its importance for consumption and 
second in terms of the degree of effort or "drudgery" it takes to earn the extra money. 
As goods increase from the family's work the subjective evaluation of each new 
dollar's significance for consumption decreases, but, the drudgery of working for it 
increases. Therefore, the family labourers will work only to the extent that "an 
equilibrium is reached between the drudgery, or work, and the significance of the needs 
for whose satisfaction the labour is endured" (Chayanov 1986:6). 
The point at which this equilibrium between drudgery and demand satisfaction is 
reached is changeable. It depends firstly on the conditions (environmental, topographical, 
etc.) under which the farm operates, its market situation, and the farm's location in 
relation to markets. These factors determine the degree of drudgery. It relies secondly 
on family size, composition, and the urgency of family demands. These determine 
consumption evaluation. 
The farm family has to make use of its market situation and natural conditions in 
a way that enables it to provide an internal equilibrium for family labour and the highest 
possible standard of family well-being. This is only achieved by including in the farm's 
organizational plan the labour investments, be they specific crops, livestock, machinery, 
craft-work, etc., that promise the hi&hest possible labour payment per labour unit 
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(Chayanov 1986:7). Therefore, acceptance of a certain course of economic action 
by the farm family is not determined by the calculation of the highest net profit. Rather, 
economic behaviour is determined by the need to meet the subjective evaluations of both 
demand satisfaction and drudgery of labour. Usually the objects that yield the highest 
labour payment per unit are roughly the same as those that guarantee the highest net 
profit to capitalists as well. However, the "structural peculiarities" of the family labour 
farm are such as to make it undertake very different conduct from capitalist units under 
somewhat similar circumstances (Chayanov 1986:7). 
Take for instance the case of economic rent. For a capitalist farmer an increase 
in the quality of the land farmed or a better location of that land results in "rent", an 
objective economic category one can calculate by subtracting material costs of 
production, wages, and the interest on capital from gross income. "Rent" then becomes 
profit for the capitalist farmer. However, according to Chayanov, the concept of 
economic rent does not exist for the family farmer. The move to better land or location 
does not produce the same response from the family farmer as it does for the capitalist 
farmer, i.e., the prosperity of the family farm does not increase so markedly as does the 
return to a capitalist farm influenced by the same factors. Why is this? 
A move to better land and/or location for the farm family will result in an 
increase in labour productivity. The labourers on the farm, noticing this increase, will 
seek to balance the internal equilibrium of the farm, which in this case will mean less 
self-exploitation of labour power since the family's demands can be satisfied with less 
expenditure of labour power (Chayanov 1986:8). So, the family farm labourers simply 
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stop working as hard as they did previously because they can get the same product with 
less effort in their improved situation. 
Family farmers, according to Chayanov, also behave differently from capitalist 
farmers when it comes to buying and selling land. This again is related to the family 
farm's attempt to reach internal equilibrium and maximize net income. Tenancy or land 
acquisitions are only advantageous to family farmers if, through them, the farm family 
can reach internal equilibrium with either an increased level of living or with decreased 
expenditure of labour power. 
Peasants will not buy or rent more land if they already have enough to employ 
all of their family labourers at the optimum degree of intensity of cultivation. Chayanov 
postulates that family farmers will only buy or lease land only if acquiring it will allow 
them to use unemployed family labour power (1986:9). Using labour power previously 
lost in forced inactivity allows them to bring the farm's "intensity nearer the optimum" 
(i.e., closer to internal equilibrium between drudgery and demand). 
The end result of a land purchase or lease should be an increase in payment per 
labour unit and a rise in prosperity important enough "to enable the family unit to pay 
for the lease or to purchase a large part of the gross product obtained from the newly 
acquired plot" (Chayanov 1986:9). This produces the seeming paradox that the less land 
the peasant family owns, i.e., the poorer it is, the more it will be willing to pay for land. 
When the peasant farm does not have enough land to employ all of its labour the 
only way, aside from engaging in wage labour, to counteract this "unemployment" is to 
somehow get more land, thereby raising productivity per labour unit and through this the 
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well-being of the family. Therefore, the higher the rural population density the greater 
the land prices since peasants with little land in these situations will pay prices well 
beyond that of the capitalized rent - beyond the price a capitalist farm will be willing to 
pay for it. 
Similarly, family farmers will not indulge in other capital expenditures such as 
machinery unless it allows for the possibility of a higher level of family well-being. If 
a new capital expenditure promises increased prosperity through increasing labour 
productivity without unbalancing the farm's internal equilibrium the family labour farm 
can pay an unusually high rate of interest for the capital required to purchase the entity. 
However, the rate of interest cannot be so high as to completely negate the advantages 
of the new investment (Chayanov 1986: 10). 
In the family farm this "circulation of capital" does not produce an income from 
capital as it would on the capitalist farm. Instead it affects the net labour product of the 
farm and through this the critical moment of internal economic equilibrium between 
drudgery and demand satisfaction. In addition, if the family does not borrow money for 
capital expenditure then the decision on whether or not to invest will depend not only on 
the advantage the expenditure will provide but on whether the family can spare the 
amount for the investment from its labour income. 
Because the money for the purchase comes out of the labour income it will mean 
a drop in the family's immediate consumption. Therefore, the decision to purchase will 
be made only if what the family has to give up in consumption appears, in the eyes of 
the family, to be less than its value for production (Chayanov 1986:11). The larger the 
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income of the family the easier it will be for them to find the resources for capital 
investment, but in hard times with smaller net incomes, the farm family will find it 
difficult to take money intended for consumption to use for new capital investment or 
even to replace circulating capital. 
These peculiar characteristics of the family farm can lead to a different evolution 
than predicted by mainline economists or traditional Marxists. Family farmer's motives 
are very different from capitalist farmers - the goal of family farmers is maximizing net 
income via internal economic equilibrium rather than simply making a profit. Evidence 
from Chayanov and from contemporary developing societies shows that because family 
farmers operate on this "maximization of net income" rationale they will sometimes have 
the capacity to out-compete capitalist farms based on wage labour, to buy out large land-
holders, and to offer goods at the cheapest price (Durrenberger 1984; Newby 1978). 
Mainline Marxists have argued that family farmers can only out-compete capitalist 
farms by intense self-exploitation , i.e., "excruciating labour by underfed peasant families 
which damages their physical and mental well-being" (Shanin 1986:6) and in the long run 
will eventually lose out to capitalists. Chayanov, however, pointed out that there was 
more to peasant farming than this. He showed that for different agricultural regions and 
sub-branches of farming at any given stage of technology there are different optimum 
sizes. 
"For any farming system, taking account of local conditions, we may, by 
a series of organizational calculations,determine both the technically most 
expedient relationshipof its production factors and the absolute size of the 
farmitself to give the lowest cost for produce and consequent! y, the highest 
income" (Chayanov 1986:90). 
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A decrease as well as an increase from the optimum will make productivity 
decline. "Any excess of production means available to labour, or of land above the 
technically optimal level, will be an excessive burden on the undertaking" (Chayanov 
1986:92). These extra means of production will not lead to an increased volume of 
activity since further intensity .of labour beyond the level established for its self-
exploitation is unacceptable to the family. 
In addition to this family farmers operated in a social context of family's, 
kinsmen's, and neighbour's aid and unwaged labour. Therefore, family labour units 
were not simply an instance of the weak surviving through super-exploitation of their 
labour power but also reflected the utilization of some characteristics of farming and 
rural social life that occasionally give the edge to the family-labour farm over the 
capitalist farm. This, in tum, means that under capitalism the relative well-being of 
family farmers is still a possibility even though there may be self-exploitation and 
exploitation (Shanin 1986:6). 
Chayanov pointed out the means of resistance that family farmers could and did 
use to counter exploitation, something Lenin seemed to ignore. As such his analysis 
parallels sociological research that examines the resources available to the working class 
in their resistance to capitalists. Family farmers, like urban workers, have not been 
completely passive victims of capitalists. They draw on particular economic and social 
resources to preserve their family's well-being. They have also organized on an 
occupational basis to further their economic demands and to better their economic and 
social conditions. In North America, farmers' social and political movements have often 
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achieved more political success than labour movements have (Lipset 1950; Russell 1975; 
Saloutus and Hicks 1951). 
As well, Chayanov's analysis assumes the simultaneous existence of very different 
forms of economic systems. He argued that this empirical "pluralism" should be matched 
by conceptual pluralism. In other words, because a number of economic systems could 
exist side by side one needed a number of explanatory models for each (Chayanov 
1986:27-28). He applied this to family farming, noting that family farms co-exist with 
other economic "systems". Although the dominant capitalist system influenced family 
farming, this did not cause its "peculiarities" to vanish. 
Implications of Each Approach for the Future of Family Farmers 
Agricultural economists are not sounding alarm bells over the high rates of 
foreclosure or over the persistent decline in the number of family farms over the last two 
decades. Instead they argue that the farm economy is actually recovering and that recent 
foreclosures have merely wiped out inefficient producers. Getting rid of these inefficient 
farmers, they argue, should mean even lower food prices because only the most 
productive farmers survive. 
Marxists, however, point to foreclosures and the decline trend as evidence of the 
eventual destruction of family farming. They view them as the logical outcome of larger 
processes of capital concentration and integration. As capitalism grows ever nearer its 
highest stage of development it will inevitably squeeze out family farmers, absorbing 
them into either the proletariat or the agrarian bourgeoisie. 
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However, the third perspective interprets foreclosures and decline somewhat 
differently. Extending this argument to predict the future of family farms in capitalist 
economies produces a scenario similar to that of the core/periphery industry theory in 
which family farms form an integral part of . the capitalist system and constitute a 
production segment similar to that of secondary industry. 
Proponents of this third perspective point out that farmers, like smaller 
manufacturers in the industrial sector, produce high risk but necessary commodities. 
Larger firms like to concentrate their production by either directly controlling all the 
components needed for their end product. However, they also wish to minimize risk. 
Therefore if a particular production component involves a high risk of production failure 
larger firms may find it more profitable to contract out or to buy these items from 
independent firms. This allows larger corporate firms to avoid responsibility for potential 
production failure. 
Extending this paradigm to agriculture, agribusiness firms depend on farm 
commodities such as plant crops and livestock. However, agricultural production, in most 
instances, involves substantial risk since it is subject to uncontrollable environmental and 
biological influences. Hence agribusiness capitalists prefer to leave the production of 
most foodstuffs to small producers. Capitalists will only enter the direct production of 
foodstuffs if such production provides at least the average rate of profit and is not high 
risk. 
These "dependency" theorists predict that small farmers will survive because of 
the riskiness and low returns of agricultural production. However, they do not presume 
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either the economic or social vitality of the family farm. Rather they contend that 
capitalist penetration into agriculture will transform the class situation of family farmers 
(Mooney 1985; Pfeffer 1985a; Pfeffer 1985b). They argue that small farmers will fall 
into a contradictory class location between independent producers and the working class. 
This change in class location will produce a corresponding decline in family farmers' 
social and economic well-being. Family farmers will lose control over the labour process 
and their work will become increasingly subject to the direction of agribusiness and 
financial capitalists. 
The next chapter reviews the existing sociological research on the organization 
of farming in the United States. I examine the literature from each of the three 
perspectives identified in this chapter and present the conclusions and predictions of the 
authors of each persuasion. 
SURVEYING THE FIELD: A REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERA TORE 
In the previous chapter I outlined the three prevailing paradigms used to explain 
the evolution of American agriculture. In this chapter I review the sociological research 
literature in each theoretical area. I begin with an examination of the sociological work 
that follows a neo-classical economic line of reasoning, follow with the Marxist 
literature, and end with an examination of the dependency research findings. 
"Farming is a Business": Mechanized Mega-farms as Farms of the Future 
Rural sociologists who subscribe to the view that farming is a business like any 
other have focused their research on those farms that are indeed businesses and operate 
via strict business accounting methods of profit and loss. Hiram Drache's (1976) work 
offers the only in-depth research on capitalist farmers and their development in the U.S. 
hence this section reviews only his work. 
Drache, through historical research on early corporate farms in the mid-west and 
personal interviews with present-day mid-western corporate farmers in Montana, North 
Dakota, Minnesota, South Dakota, and Iowa, gives us a picture of what he believes the 
future of farming in America will, and should, be. Drache sees decreases in the number 
of farmers as a positive rather than negative achievement in American agriculture 
(1976:430). The trend toward smaller numbers of farmers producing ever more 
commodities signifies a highly efficient agricultural system. He equates efficiency with 
man hours per unit of production, as do the farmers he interviews. The goal of 
agriculture, according to these corporate farmers, is to produce food ever more cheaply 
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and the only way to do this is through organizing farms along strict business lines. These 
"progressive" farmers "look at farming as a good business ... that, if properly managed, 
can be just as profitable as any other business. Modern farming, like any other business, 
is a matter of mechanization, money, and management" (Drache 1976:430). 
Agricultural efficiency, argues Drache, has come about through technological 
innovations in the areas of mechanization, seed hybridization, improved stock breeding 
and feeding practices, the use of "additives" to crops such as pesticides, herbicides, and 
commercial fertilizers, and the vertical integration of large farming operations. Drache 
argues the farmers who have been responsible for these innovations are corporate farmers 
and they have large and successful because of their hard work, perservance, and 
willingness to adopt new methods of production. 
What Drache documents, but fails to emphasize, is the advantages these corporate 
farmers started with that enabled their hard work and perserverance to reap greater 
payoffs than less advantaged, but equally hard-working and dedicated farmers. In every 
case each of these farmers started out with more land, in some cases, vastly more land, 
than ordinary homesteaders. In every case except one this land was much better than 
average and generally located in river valleys. In addition, their families had, from the 
homesteading days, relied on more than just farming for income. All had business 
interests and their family histories describe business involvement in such enterprises as 
machinery dealerships, agricultural supply dealerships, banks, local stores, elevator 
companies, power plants, and, in one case, a machinery manufacturing plant (c.f., 
Drache, Chapters V, VI, and VII). In some cases farming served as the secondary 
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industry rather than the primary one with the family business subsidizing the family 
farm. 
Their business interests enabled these farmers to purchase more land, afford the 
latest in technology, and generally improve the quality of their farming operations. They 
also gave these farmers an edge in selling their produce. Because they did not have to 
rely solely on income from their farm commodities they could hold their produce until 
market highs and get a greater return on their grain and livestock (Drache 1976: 
183,188). Others got higher returns by direct marketing through their own elevators or 
livestock feedlots and shipping companies (Drache 1976: 176, 232-235). 
Drache ignores the edge these farmers had on others and proceeds to argue the 
farming methods used by these large farmers are the way of the future since it is by these 
methods alone that they have become successful. He also ignores the environmental 
consequences of large farms. He feels the use of large four-wheel drive machinery for 
grain farming, the use of herbicides and pesticides, the movement towards few hybrid 
varieties of cash-grains, and the production of livestock in confined environments 
produce only good in that they result in increased production and thereby lower prices 
(Drache 1976: 260-261,448). Each of these practices, however, has severe environmental 
costs. 
Mechanization saves farmers labour but it also causes soil degradation and weed 
infestation. It has probably caused the greatest problems in the great plains region. Four-
wheel drive tractors used on large acreages both erode and compact the soil. The 
introduction of combines for small-grain farming, while greatly reducing labour time 
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needed for harvest, have also greatly increased the spread of weeds. Combining scatters 
weed seeds throughout the entire field during harvest (Ian Miller, personal 
communication, October 1989). The weed infestation problem has become so severe in 
some areas that farmers have resorted to the herbicide Glean, which essentially sterilizes 
the soil, preventing not only weed growth but greatly reducing the quality of the soil (Ian 
Miller, Wallace Miller, Dave Pearson; personal communication, May 1990). Threshing 
machines may have required more labour than combines but they had the advantage of 
controlling weeds since grain, and consequently weeds, were threshed in only a few spots 
in the field. Mechanization has also become a more expensive proposition over the years 
as fuel prices and machinery and parts prices spiral ever upwards. 
Raising beef, hogs, and poultry in confined spaces such as beef feedlots, hog 
farrowing crates and "growing" barns, chicken cages, and turkey pens increases the 
incidence of disease and parasitic pests (Drache 1976:402). Farmers who raise livestock 
in this manner have increasingly relied on regular administration of antibiotics with daily 
feeding to control disease whether or not animals are diseased (Schell 1983: 62-65). They 
resort to heavy applications of pesticide to control insect problems like flies in feedlots 
and lice in chicken barns (Schell 1983: 155-162). The overuse of antibiotics in livestock 
production and the consequences of it have been well documented by Schell (1983). 
As the indiscriminate prescription of penicillin to prostitutes in Vietnam produced 
an antibiotic resistant strain of gonorrhoea, Neisseria gono"heae, so has the overuse of 
penicillin and tetracycline in American livestock production produced resistant strains of 
dysentery, streptococci, and staphylococci bacteria (Schell 1983: 24,36). The frightening 
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thing about these bacteria is their ability to transfer themselves to human hosts (Schell 
1983: 24,32,41,118-119). The transfer has greatly alarmed biologists and medical 
researchers. Many feel we may be forced back into a pre-antibiotic era unless we put a 
stop to the overuse of antibiotics in both humans and animals (Schell 1983: 27,41,121). 
The story of pesticides and herbicides parallels that of antibiotic resistant bacteria. 
These came into widespread use after World War II and their destructive potential was 
first pointed out in the 1960's by Rachel Carson in her book Silent Spring. As with 
antiobiotics and bacteria, herbicides and pesticides eventually produce resistant strains 
of weeds and insects while at the same time destroying their natural enemies. Eventually 
we reach the point where the herbicide or pesticide no longer is effective and the plant 
or insect has too few natural enemies left. Infestations result and, as noted above, some 
farmers have resorted to completely destroying soil fertility simply to wipe out herbicide-
resistant weeds. 
So Drache may laud his corporate farmers for their greatly increased production 
and consequent lowering of commodities prices but their methods are ecologically 
unsound. Highly specialized, large-scale farming techniques, as practiced by corporate 
farmers and those family farmers able to afford such methods, may well contain the 
"seeds of their own destruction". I tum now to the Marxist literature on the development 
of agriculture in capitalist economies. 
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Family Farmers as the Petit Boureeoisie: Losine Out to Capitalist Aericulture 
The major thesis of Marxists is that family farmers' present situation stems in 
large part from the growth of monopoly capitalism. Marxists argue that agribusiness 
incursions into the agricultural sector have promoted a polarization process in U.S. 
agriculture creating a current situation in which most of our remaining farmers comprise 
either large-scale, highly mechanized operators or small, marginalized agriculturalists 
relying heavily on off-farm income for their livelihood. 
Traditional Marxists posit that corporate capitalist agribusiness will eventually 
destroy family farms. Independent farmers continue to exist in advanced capitalist 
societies, they argue, only because of capitalist inattention and risky investment 
problems. Farming constitutes the "last frontier" for capitalists and they have not yet 
turned their attention to solving the problem of high risk and slow return on investment 
in the production of certain agricultural commodities. But when they do agribusiness 
firms will move in and destroy small producers. 
Marxists have concentrated on documenting declining numbers of family farms, 
the growing numbers of corporate farms, and the monopoly corporate farmers have over 
specific foodstuffs. They also devote research to the study of the rural proletariat -
agricultural labourers. Goss et al. (1980) analysis of U.S. agricultural census data from 
1920 to 1978 shows declining numbers of family farmers for the U.S. as a whole from. 
They also identify a trend towards greater numbers of days spent on off-farm work on 
the part of family farmers and greater reliance on off-farm income. Their examination 
of the data on numbers of corporate farms reveals an increase in the percentage of 
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corporate farms and in the amount of farmland these farms control. On the basis of these 
statistics they conlcude that family farmers in the U.S. are in the process of 
proletarianization. They predict the eventual demise of family farmers and the take-over 
of the agricultural sector by corporate farmers. Havens (1985) points to the expanding 
number of farm commodities that are now dominated by corporate farms or agribusiness 
firms who have moved into actual food production. 
Capitalist movement into the actual production of agricultural commodities 
through farms owned by an individual or groups of individuals solely for the purpose of 
making a profit and employing wage rather than family labour to do the farm work 
represents one way in which capitalism undermines family farming. When looking at 
capitalist domination of certain commodities, however, one must keep in mind that 
capitalist farms are not recent developments in the U.S. Much of southern and 
southwestern American agriculture followed and still follows this type of arrangement 
(Howe 1982; Vogeler 1978). In addition, most of corporate farms are family-owned 
corporations although it is true that large corporations such as Tenneco and Campbell's 
have moved into actual food production. 
The increasing numbers of corporate farms are generally interpreted as the big 
winning out over the small, e.g., large farmers push small farmers out of production in 
certain areas producers. Marxists view this as merely another step, and a predictable one, 
in the proletarianization of family farmers. While individual family farms, whether 
large or small, still predominate in grain farming, mixed farming, dairying, and hog and 
cattle production, corporations have gained significant control over the actual food 
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farmers depending upon the type of foodstuffs they are producing, e.g., northern plains 
wheat farmers as opposed to corn-soybean-livestock farmers of the midwest; 
identification of the factors that promote the growth of some family farmers; and the 
possibility of a non-linear developmental model for agriculture in capitalist economies. 
The following discussion presents research on family farmers from a perspective that 
draws heavily on the Chayanovian tradition - dependency theory. 
Family Farmers and Independent Commodity Production 
Family labour farms diverge from capitalist enterprises because they rely almost 
exclusively on family labour instead of wage labour and because the household is both 
a production and a consumption unit. Although most economists class them as small 
capitalists, family farmers don't operate on the same principles as capitalists. The 
overriding goal of capitalists is to reap the average rate of profit from their business. If 
an operation fails to achieve or maintain this rate capitalists abandon it. 
As Chayanov pointed out family farmer's motives differ in that farmers strive to 
maximize their net income by getting the most out of the bundle of resources they 
control. To stay "in business" family farmers do not have to realize a specific rate of 
profit. Rather they can continue to operate as long as they make enough income to 
accommodate their subsistence needs and the maintenance needs of the farm. Unlike 
capitalists, family farmers will settle for a lower rate of profit and sometimes no profit 
at all. 
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This ability gives them a distinct advantage over capitalist farmers in certain types 
of agricultural production. For example, grain farming in the midwest and western states 
involves low return on investments. In the late 19th century wheat-producing family 
farmers outlasted capitalist "bonanza" wheat farmers apparently because they could 
survive on lower rates of return than their profit-oriented counterparts and could more 
fully utilized the labour power of their families than bonanza farmers could utilize the 
labour of their hired hands (Drache 1976: 183). 
In 1987 individual or family farms still dominated U.S. agriculture and constituted 
86.6 percent of all farms (U.S. Census of Agriculture 1987). In addition, the percentage 
of family farms in the U.S. remained steady from 1920 to 1987. In spite of predictions 
to the contrary family farm organization has survived as a form of agricultural production 
under advanced capitalism. 
Of the remaining thirteen percent of all farms partnerships accounted for just over 
nine percent of farms; corporations comprised slightly over three percent of total farm 
ownership; and co-operatives, estates, or trusts made up six-tenths of one percent of all 
farms. The vast majority of these corporate farms (85.0%) consisted of smaller family 
corporations with 10 or fewer shareholders, while family corporations with more than 
ten shareholders accounted for 3.0 percent of all corporate farms. Non-family 
corporations with less than 10 shareholders made up 10.0 percent of all corporate farms 
and non-family corporations with 10 or more shareholders comprised the remaining 1.9 
percent of corporate farm owners (Table 1). Three-fifths (59.2%) of all farmers owned 
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all their land while thirty percent (29.3%) were part-owners and twelve percent (11.6%) 
were tenants. 
While family farmers make up the majority of producers this does not mean 
everything is well on the family farm. We still have more family farmers than other 
types of farmers but there are far fewer of them than in the past. Dependency theorists 
have been most interested in those family farmers who continue to survive in spite of low 
commodities prices and increasing operating expenses. 
Dependency theorists want to know what it is about family farming in capitalist 
economies that has enabled these operators to endure such prohibitive conditions. Their 
interest has been two-fold: they have looked at both family farmers' survival tactics and 
at what they see as the inherent weaknesses in capitalist business organization that 
prevent capitalists from moving directly into agricultural production. 
These theorists do not romanticize the survival of the family farm. Rather they 
view it as filling the interstices of a capitalist agribusiness sector somewhat the same way 
in which secondary industries fill the production gaps for large corporations in the 
industrial sector. Like small manufacturers, family farmers produce high risk 
commodities for oligopolistic buyers, e.g., agribusiness firms like Cargill, Dreyfuss, or 
Green Giant, and are subject to the same marginal and controlled existence this 
engenders in the industrial sphere, e.g., auto parts suppliers for General Motors, Ford, 
and Chrysler. They feel family farms continue because they provide an advantage to 
agribusiness just as secondary manufacturers provide an advantage to industrial capitalists 
- by taking all the risk and receiving only marginal returns. 
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Researchers utilizing dependency perspectives have argued family farms will 
continue to exist but in a more exploited position than in the past. The exploitation comes 
about through the efforts of agribusiness firms and financial institutions to control family 
farmers by other means than moving directly into food production. Agribusiness capitalist 
and financial capitalists can dominate farmers by taking over some aspects of the 
production process from them, such as decisions over what crops to grow, what crop 
production methods to use, and who to sell their crops to. This can happen through 
three developments: indebtedness, contract farming, and part-time farming. Each of these 
processes result in increasing exploitation of family farmers labour and loss of autonomy 
over their farming operations. In opposition to the relatively independent producer of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries late twentieth farmers, according to dependency 
theorists, have moved toward the status of "propertied labourers". 
Family Farmers as "Propertied Labourers" 
The loss of control by family farmers' over certain parts of the agricultural 
production process - has provoked two explanations. Traditional Marxists see 
indebtedness, contract farming, and part-time farming as simply steps in the movement 
towards eventual proletarianization. However, dependency theorists see these processes 
as turning family farmers into a class of individuals who own the means of production, 
e.g., land, but who do not completely control the use to which these means are put. 
The dependency approach to family farming explains the continued existence of 
family labour farms because of their advantage to capitalist development. These theorists 
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view family farming not as "evidence of a lack of capitalist development but as an 
integral part of the capitalist system within which it has been shaped and maintained 
through decades of dependence and exploitation" (Davis 1980: 134). 
In the decades since the mid-19th century the family farm has become 
increasingly integrated into a system of exploitative capitalist relations. Dependency 
theorists argue that this integration has led not only to the maintenance of the family farm 
but its domination by agribusiness and finance capitalists (Davis 1980: 135). They argue 
that this capitalist domination transforms the majority of family farmers into "propertied 
labourers - a contradictory class location between the petty bourgeoisie and wage-
labourers (Mooney 1985). They contend that family farmers will continue to occupy such 
a class position because they provide monopoly capital with particular advantages not 
obtained elsewhere. 
At the theoretical level the argument takes its departure from Marx's view that 
possession of the means of production guarantees no absolute protection against 
exploitation. Indeed, even the propertied may have their surplus value expropriated. 
Although Marx saw individual private property as a barrier against the capitalist mode 
of production because the labourer can accumulate for himself, this is only the case if 
possessing the means of production assures autonomous production (Davis 1980: 138). 
The presence of smaller, "independent" producers, who still own their means of 
production, does not automatically indicate a lack of capitalist encroachment into that 
sector of the economy. 
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Instead, increasing indebtedness, contract farming, and part-time farming (off-farm 
work) have promoted a loss of production autonomy and the expropriation of surplus 
value from farmers. As a result of these processes the farmer has moved from being part 
of the petty bourgeoisie to occupying a more mixed, or contradictory, class location. The 
farmer is transformed into a "propertied labourer" who is not completely proletarianized 
since he still owns part of his means of production and has some, although not complete, 
control over the labour process (Mooney 1985:8). It is to these three processes that I now 
turn, looking initially at the literature dealing with indebtedness, then at contract farming, 
and finally at part-time farming. 
Loss of Control Through Indebtedness 
The nature of agricultural credit systems exacerbates the increasing capitalist 
penetration into agriculture and the "cost-price" squeeze on family farmers. In order to 
keep up with new techniques and increase production farmers have had to borrow money 
from financial institutions. Costs of machinery, chemicals, fuel and land require 
investments and high expenditures. Large amounts of money have to be advanced just 
to begin each crop year. In 1975, for instance, each acre brought under cultivation 
required an initial output of $82 (Havens 1985:27) but farmers had to wait at least six 
months for a return on this investment. 
As farm costs increase and commodity prices decrease, many farmers find that they 
can barely maintain interest payments on debts let alone pay off the principal. 
Indebtedness creates the conditions under which farmers lose control over actual farm 
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production because farmers enter production contracts to overcome their debt payments 
and because banks pressure them into particular production strategies (or processes) 
(Mitchell 1972:21; Mooney 1982:8). 
Increased indebtedness of full-owner operators occasioned by sky-rocketing input 
costs means that most farmers have become enormously dependent on credit institutions 
for continued operation. Mooney (1985:9) argues that the interest on a loan secured by 
the land approximates a rent and puts farmers in the position of tenants even though they 
formally hold title to the land. Interest payments, like rent, constitute an appropriation 
of surplus value from direct producers and fulfill one criterion of the proletarianization 
process. 
In addition, control of capital by the creditor also erodes the direct producer's power 
over the labour process. The more dependent a producer becomes on the creditor the 
more the creditor can control the producer's labour process. However, producers vary 
in whether they have access to alternative sources of credit and in their credit "standing" 
(Green 1984:570). Hence, some producers depend more on financial credit systems than 
others. 
Mooney's (1985) interviews with Wisconsin farmers indicated that banks 
increasingly direct how some of the indebted farmers' produce (e.g., what to plant, 
methods of production, etc.). Creditors threaten with foreclosure farmers who do not 
follow creditors' instructions. Thus, creditors can gain the power to structure both the 
producer's means of production and the labour process. "The appearance of being one's 
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own boss is reproduced while the basis of that autonomy is undermined" (Mooney 
1982:10). 
Therefore, through indebtedness creditors can extract the farmer's surplus value 
via interest payments and control the farmer's labour process via directing production. 
Each process moves the family farmer toward proletarianization. This transformation, 
however, remains incomplete without foreclosure. Since some credit institutions choose 
to "manage" farmers' production rather than to foreclose, these producers fall into a 
contradictory class location between the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat (Mooney 
1985: 10). 
If banks used foreclosure more extensively, farmers would become completely 
proletarianized and confirm the theses of traditional Marxists. However, creditors refrain 
from foreclosures because they obtain a greater economic advantage when they 
perpetually extract interest from indebted family farmers. If the creditors acquired the 
land through foreclosure they would then have to sell it or hire managers for it. Instead 
the creditors reap the benefit of the family farmer's "willingness" and ability to work 
even harder and generate enough surplus value to pay the interest on his debts. In other 
words, creditors profit when they maintain the indebted relationship. They favour the 
certain gains they obtain from interest payments and direct control of the production 
process over the uncertain gains from foreclosures and sale of the · property (Mooney 
1985: 11). 
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However, indebtedness is only one way in which farmers move into the 
contradictory class location of propertied labourers. Family farmers can also lose control 
over their labour process through contract farming. 
Loss of Control Through Contract Fanning 
Contract farming has become increasingly common in vegetable production (Mooney 
1985; Pfeffer 1985a). Davis (1980:142) equates it with industrial piece work wage 
agreements. Under contract farming farmers produce agricultural commodities at an 
agreed upon unit price. The farmer contributes his labour power and tools of production 
(land, machinery, etc.), while the agribusiness firm provides the inputs such as seed, 
fertilizer, feed, etc. Under contract farming agribusiness expropriates the surplus value 
and the farmer loses primary control over production decisions, the labour process, and 
some of the means of production (e.g., inputs). Therefore, contract farming also 
promotes the transformation of the independent farmer into a propertied labourer. 
Although the farmer participates in many production decisions and holds full title 
to the contracted product, the agribusiness firm maintains direct control over how 
production will proceed. The agribusiness firm insists on a tight production schedule 
because this facilitates processing, extends the production season, and increases the 
number of production cycles. In addition agribusiness encourages farmers to mechanize 
extensively to maximize product output per man hour and to use highly "innovative" new 
hybrids, chemicals, and techniques. These practices supposedly allow farmers to 
"improve" quality, increase yields, and use their equipment, facilities and land more 
54 
effectively (Davis 1980: 143; Mooney 1985: 11). However, they also reduce unit costs and 
the agribusiness capitalist profits when the contract farmer realizes his production 
potential as fully as possible. 
Since agribusiness firms pay farmers according to "quality" of product and time of 
delivery farmers will work harder and longer with no increase in pay to improve 
productivity. This not only reduces the unit cost of production but increases product 
quality and yields for the same amount of labour time. 
In addition, contract farming has similar advantages for agribusiness firms that 
sub-contracting has for monopoly industrial firms. As in the industrial sector, 
agribusiness firms limit their production to low risk commodities (Pfeffer 1985a: 1). 
Where producers cannot control market uncertainties through increases in size large firms 
prefer to sub-contract for inputs. In these cases monopoly capital can operate more 
efficiently without entering into direct production. 
In fact, direct production of agricultural commodities involves a number of "risks" 
(Mann and Dickinson 1980). For instance, poor environmental conditions, insect plagues, 
disease, and natural disasters can completely wipe out crops. This leaves the direct 
producer with nothing to show for his investment of time and money. Agribusiness firms 
protect themselves from such uncertainties when they let the farmer bear the costs of 
failed production. 
Direct production of agricultural commodities also demands high levels of initial 
investments and a delay of at least six months for a return on capital. Costs of land, 
machinery, fuel, seed, and chemicals are extremely high. The agribusiness firm that 
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engages in contracting can minimize these high input costs. It only supplies some of the 
inputs (typically seed and chemicals) while it relies on the farmer to provide the most 
expensive inputs (fuel, land, machinery) (Pfeffer 1985a). Furthermore, the firm can delay 
paying the farmer for his labour time until he delivers the product. 
However, contract farming represents one way for the farmer to cut his costs (the 
cost of pesticides and seed for instance) and thereby increase his income. Another method 
family farmers are relying on to supplement farm income is wage labour. This turns 
them into "part-time" farmers. 
Loss of Control through Part-time Fanning 
Increasing numbers of farmers engage in off-farm wage-work and farm only part-
time. These part-time farmers may occupy two class locations: propertied farmer and 
wage-labourer. While farmers may avoid debt, tenancy, or contract farming through 
wage-work they remain "independent" in their farm work only at the price of selling 
their labour-power elsewhere (Mooney 1985: 14). Off-farm work, therefore, also moves 
the farmer into the contradictory class location between the petty bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat. 
Empirical research on the wage wrok part-time farmers engage in is sparse. From 
Mooney's work in Wisconsin we know that some part-time farmers engage in agricultural 
wage-work when they work off their own farm. They work as hired hands for larger 
neighbouring farmers, helping out during the busiest times of the season (Mooney 1985). 
Like indebtedness and contract-farming the presence of a number of part.:time farmers 
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potentially benefits capitalists. In this case the benefits accrue to those capitalists directly 
involved in agricultural production -large farmers relying on wage labour (Pfeffer 
1985b). 
As Pfeffer (1985b:18-19) points out, part-time farmers form a likely labour pool 
with assets that capitalist farmers would not find elsewhere. Because part-time farmers 
generally live in the same area as the larger farmers that they work for they are readily 
available for work. Furthermore, they have other means of subsistence besides 
agricultural wage labour so they accept the seasonality of agricultural work. As a result, 
the employer does not have to compensate these workers for periods of "lay-off''. Part-
time farmers are also skilled workers. Their knowledge of production techniques and 
machinery operation matches that of their employer's. Employers don't have to train 
them and can trust them to do the job properly. 
Based on the preceding descriptions of indebtedness, contract farming, and part-
time farming dependency theorists predict the continued existence of family farmers for 
three reasons: companies and banks can avoid the risks of agricultural production by both 
indebtedness and contract farming and capitalist farmers are assured of a skilled and 
readily available labour force by part-time farming. Family farmers will survive but in 
a much altered form from the archetypal independent farmer relying completely on farm 
income for his livelihood and employing family labour to run the farm. 
Related to the non-linear development notion is the possibility that the 
development of agriculture may not be uniform across a nation. Certain types of 
agricultural production may lend themselves better to a family farm type of organization 
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than to a capitalist type of organization. Newby (1978) and Buttell (1980) point to 
dairying and cereal production as types of production favouring family farm organization 
rather than capitalist organization. 
The fate of family farmers in situations of debt, contract-farming, and part-time 
farming remains uncertain. The creditor/debtor relationship seems the most precarious 
one for family farmers since bank foreclosures account for most of the recent family 
farm liquidations. Contract farming and engaging in off-farm work can become survival 
strategies for family farmers. These practices allow farmers to stay on the farm, avoid 
increasing indebtedness, and reduce some of the risks involved in production. So instead 
of viewing these developments as completely inimical to family farmers researchers 
should also realize they provide resources for family farmers. 
Although trends over the past 67 years indicate decreasing numbers of family 
farmers in the U.S., the proportion of family farmers has not changed much. What has 
changed is the size of farms and the way in which farm work is done. Looking at the 
U.S. as a whole farms have expanded in size by over 300 acres and farmers increasingly 
rely on machines to aid them in their work. However, looking at national data obscures 
regional differences among farmers. Farm size, tenure of farm operators, farm 
organization, and reliance on hired labour vary from region to region, depending on what 
farmers are producing. For instance, farmers in California and the southwestern states 
have always relied more heavily on agricultural wage workers than have northern and 
midwestern farmers. In addition capitalist farms are not recent developments in the west 
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and southwest. Capitalist farming in these areas dates back to the mid-nineteenth century 
(c.f., Vogeler 1978). 
Before coming to the conclusion that family farmers are on the road to extinction 
we should instead try to discover why the greatest proportion of farms in the U.S. still 
remain family farms and how these farmers have adapted to changing economic 
conditions. To look more closely at family farmers and their strategies I have selected 
two states, North Dakota and Illinois, where farming began with family homesteading 
and has continued to be primarily organized on the lines of family labour farming. 
I chose states where agriculture has been, and still is, characterized by family 
labour farms to better illustrate changes in farm organization over the past 67 years. If 
one makes the assertion that capitalist farms are coming to dominate agricultural 
production, as traditional Marxists fear and agricultural economists laud, one must 
demonstrate that this type of farm has indeed made notable inroads into areas where 
family labour farms had once been the hallmark of agricultural production. It is not 
enough to show that there are a significant number of corporate farms in California to 
clinch the argument of corporate farm success since California has not had a history of 
family labour farming as the primary mode of production in agriculture (Rasmussen 
1974; Vogeler 1978). One has to show that proportions of corporate farms have grown 
significantly in areas where family labour farms once dominated. 
An additional reason for using North Dakota and Illinois is that farmers in each 
area produce different types of commodities. Choosing to explore different types of 
production allows comparisons of farming strategies and provides a way in which to 
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evaluate the effect of the commodity produced on the ability of family farmers to survive 
under capitalist economic conditions. In North Dakota farmers predominantly grow wheat 
for a living and if they engage in livestock production they raise cattle. Illinois farmers 
produce corn and soybeans as their cash grains while hogs form the largest proportion 
of livestock raised in the state. By comparing these two type of production we should be 
able to see if one is more conducive to family labour farming than the other and then 
speculate on reasons as to why or why not. 
WHO GROWS WHAT, AND HOW?: INTERPRETING TIIE NUMBERS 
In order to evaluate the competing explanations for the path American agriculture 
has followed I examine data on farm numbers, farm size, farm ownership patterns, off-
farm work, farm organization, farm labour needs, and farm production patterns over 
time. I begin with a description of the changes that have taken place in the numbers and 
size of American farms. I then present farm ownership patterns to try and come to some 
conclusion about how securely family farmers hold their land. Off-farm work data is 
examined to provide an idea of how able farmers are to maintain an adequate income on 
the basis of farming alone. Finally, since a key piece of each competing explanation 
involves the organization of farming in the U.S. I look specifically at how many farms 
are organized on an individual or family level, on a partnership level, and on a corporate 
level. This organizational analysis is followed by a closer look at farms within these 
categories in terms of their labour needs and the types of commodities they produce. 
A Trend of Declining Numbers and Increasing Size 
In terms of an overall picture of the number of farms in Illinois and North Dakota 
both states exhibited a marked decline in actual farm numbers over the 1920 to 1987 
period. While the decreases were severe in each state Illinois lost more farms and more 
land in farms than North Dakota (Table 1). In 1987 Illinois had only 37 percent of the 
farms it had in 1920. Moreover total land area in farms had fallen to 80 percent of the 
1920 land area. By 1987 North Dakota had 45 percent of the number of farms it had in 
1920 while the land in farms stood at 90 percent of the land in farms in 1920. 
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In Illinois declines in farm numbers occurred in every period between each 
agricultural census except for the 1930 to 1935 period (Table 1). The same picture 
appeared in North Dakota with the only difference being two periods of farm number 
increase, the 1925 to 1930 period, and the 1930 to 1935 period. From 1920 to 1935 total 
land in farms remained the same in both states. Between 1940 and 1987 total land in 
farms exhibited an overall decrease with slight ups and downs during this interval. 
Interestingly enough the rate of farm number decrease was higher in Illinois 
between 1950 and 1964 and higher in North Dakota between 1954 and 1964 than it was 
between 1974 and 1987 (Table 1), the period that is now being touted as the "farm 
crisis". While not denying the alarming rate of recent farm number declines these 
statistics may point to changes in perception of the agricultural sector among the general 
public and to changes in the nature of farm number decline. Perhaps in the 1950's and 
1960's the reasons for number decreases stemmed more from retirement of older farmers 
who had no descendants willing to carry on the farming operation, for economic reasons 
or reasons of personal preference, whereas the crisis of the 1970's and 1980's has 
stemmed from foreclosures on farmers who still wish to carry on farming. The numbers 
decrease in the 1980's rates the label "crisis" because of the resistance, and hence 
visibility, it generates not because of the magnitude in the decrease of farm numbers. 
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Table 1. Farm Numbers for North Dakota and Illinois: 1920 to 1987 
NORm DAKOTA ILLINOIS 
Year Farms % Decrease Farms % Decrease 
1920 77,690 ** 237,181 ** 
1925 75,970 2.2% 225,601 4.9% 
1930 77,975 2.6% 214,495 4.9% 
1935 84,606 8.5% 231,312 7.8% 
1940 73,963 12.6% 213,439 7.7% 
1945 69,520 6.0% 204,239 4.3% 
1950 65,401 5.9% 195,268 4.4% 
1954 61,943 5.3% 175,543 10.1% 
1959 54,928 11.3% 154,644 11.9% 
1964 48,836 11.1% 132,822 14.1% 
1969 46,381 5.0% 123,565 7.0% 
1974 42,710 7.9% 111,049 10.1% 
1978 40,357 5.5% 104,690 5.7% 
1982 36,431 9.7% 98,483 5.9% 
1987 35,289 3.1% 88,786 9.8% 
While farm numbers decreased in both states farm size increased (Table 2). 
Increments in average farm size occurred between every census with only one exception 
in Illinois and two in North Dakota. In 1920 Illinois farms averaged 135 acres but by 
1987 the average farm was 2.38 times as large with 321 acres the average size. North 
Dakota farms averaged 466 acres in 1920 and 1,143 acres in 1987, almost two and one-
half times the size of the average 1920 farm. However, average increases in farm size 
do not give a picture of the distribution of acres. For that we need to examine the 
numbers of farms within specific size categories. 




















































In 1920 the agricultural census divided farms in the United States into six size 
categories. In 1964 the census added an extra category for farms over 2,000 acres 
(Tables 3a, 3b). Looking first at Illinois, the modal category for farm size in Illinois in 
1920, based on this six category scheme, was 50 to 179 acres (Table 3a). Fifty-six 
percent of all Illinois farms concentrated in this category. By 1987 the modal category 
had changed to 180 to 499 acres and exhibited less concentration with 30 percent of all 
farms falling into this category. 
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Table 3a. Percentage of Farms Falling Into Specified Size Categories for Illinois: 
1920 to 1987 
Siu in Acres 
Year 1-9 10-49 S0-179 180-499 500-999 
1920 3.4% 15.0% 56.2% 24.5% .7% 
1925 3.7% 15.0% 55.1% 25.4% .8% 
1930 4.2% 13.7% 53.2% 27.9% 1.0% 
1935 6.1% 15.9% 51.4% 25.6% 1.0% 
1940 6.0% 15.0% 49.6% 27.9% 1.3% 
1945 6.8% 14.9% 45.1% 31.3% 1.8% 
1950 7.2% 14.3% 43.9% 32.4% 2.0% 
1954 6.4% 12.5% 41.8% 36.6% 2.6% 
1959 4.0% 12.1% 38.2% 44.5% 4.0% 
1964 3.3% 10.9% 34.7% 43.7% 6.7% 
1969 4.1% 10.9% 33.1% 41.6% 9.1% 
1974 3.8% 12.1% 32.9% 37.6% 11.6% 
1978 4.7% 13.6% 29.8% 35.4% 13.4% 
1982 6.2% 15.7% 27.9% 32.2% 14.1% 
1987 6.7% 14.6% 26.8% 30.1% 16.1% 


















The largest percentage increase within categories came for farms of 1,000 or 
more acres. These farms comprised less than one-tenth of one percent (0.08%) of all 
farms in Illinois in 1920. However, by 1987 they made up almost six percent of all 
farms, a percentage increase of 7, 112! Farms in the 500 to 999 acre group showed the 
next largest increase. In 1987 these farms made up 16 percent of all farms whereas in 
1920 they accounted for less than one percent of all farms (0. 78 % ) . The 50 to 179 acre 
category lost the greatest percentage of farms dropping from over one-half (56.2 % ) of 
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all farms in 1920 to just over one-quarter (26.8%) of all farms in 1987. While the 180 
to 499 acre group became the modal size group in 1987 it exhibited an up and down 
pattern over the same period. By 1959 it had increased its share of all farms to 44 
percent but then declined to its present thirty percent figure. The percentage of farms in 
the 10 to 49 acre category remained fairly stable over the 67 year period comprising 15 
percent of all farms in 1920 and just over fourteen percent of all farms in 1987. Very 
small farms of one to nine acres also exhibited an up and down pattern but by 1987 made 
up about seven percent of all farms compared to their three percent share of 1920. 
In North Dakota the 1920 modal category for farms was the 180 to 499 group 
which contained over one-half (54.2) of all farms (Table 3b). As with Illinois, farms 
concentrated heavily in one category. However, by 1987 this category had experienced 
the greatest decline in percentage of farms and now comprised only 17 percent of all 
farms. The modal category had changed to 1,000 or more acres, which comprised about 
42 percent of all farms, and the distribution of farms became less concentrated than in 
1920. Of the 42 percent of farms with 1,000 acres or more of land, 28 percent were in 
the 1,000 to 1,999 acres range and 14 percent were in the 2,000 or more acres group. 
Therefore, since 1920, North Dakota has experienced a greater trend towards large and 

















Table 3b. Percentage of Farms Falling Into Specified Size 
Categories for North Dakota: 1920 to 1987 
Siu in Acres 
1,000- 2,000 
1-9 10-49 50-179 180-499 500-999 1,999 or more 
.19% .9% 16.0% 54.2% 23.7% 5.1% a 
.43% 1.2% 16.2% 53.8% 23.7% 4.7% a 
.49% 1.5% 14.1% 50.0% 27.0% 7.0% a 
1.49% 24.7% 18.2% 48.1% 23.5% 6.2% a 
.91% 2.1% 16.0% 46.1% 26.2% 8.7% a 
1.10% 1.8% 11.0% 43.0% 31.7% 11.5% a 
.91 % 1.7% 9.6% 40.7% 33.8% 13.4% a 
1.20% 1.4% 8.5% 37.4% 35.5% 16.0% a 
.49% 1.6% 7.3% 32.4% 37.6% 20.7% a 
.85% 1.6% 6.3% 27.0% 37.3% 21.8% 5.3% 
2.80% 1.6% 7.4% 23.0% 34.0% 24.5% 6.8% 
2.30% 1.8% 8.0% 21.5% 31.0% 26.5% 8.9% 
2.60% 2.2% 8.8% 19.6% 29.2% 27.6% 10.0% 
3.10% 3.1% 8.7% 18.1% 26.8% 27.6% 12.7% 
2.50% 4.5% 8.6% 17.4% 24.5% 28.4% 14.2% 
Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding. 
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The trend in both states, then, has been towards fewer farms and larger farms. 
This indicates some farmers have found increasing size necessary for continued 
operation. They must either get larger or get out. The question then becomes one of 
which farms survive to grow larger. To shed some light on that subject I tum to an 
examination of the tenure of ownership of farms and all land in farms. 
From Tenant to Full Owner or Full Owner to Tenant: Stairway 
to the Petty Bourgeoisie or Slippery Slope to the Proletariat? 
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The pattern of ownership of farm land provides ambiguous data on how well 
farmers are doing. The neo-classical economist model predicts family farmers move from 
tenancy, to part-ownership, and then to full ownership. Therefore, their measurement of 
how well farmers are doing would include a somewhat even distribution of farms 
between full owners, part-owners, and tenants. Classical Marxists, on the other hand, see 
tenancy as a precarious situation. They consider high rates of tenancy as evidence of 
family farmers tenuous hold on the land that eventually results in total loss of land and 
movement into the ranks of the rural proletariat. Marxists would view higher rates of full 
ownership as a better situation for family farmers. Part-ownership would indicate a 
condition in which family farmers found themselves in need of more land to make ends 
meet but unable to afford to buy the land outright. 
Dependency theorists view tenancy and part-ownership ambiguously. On the one 
hand, if economic times are good, part owners and tenants may have the ability to buy 
some of their rented land. Hence rates of tenancy should decrease in years when farmers 
harvest good crops. Conversely, an overall poor harvest or poor price for agricultural 
commodities puts part owners and tenants in a precarious position, often resulting in the 
inability to pay the rent and hence reduction in farm size or total movement off the land. 
In both Illinois and North Dakota tenancy rates in any given census year appear 
to reflect the overall economic situation of the U.S. in that year. Tenancy rates start to 
increase in 1925 in both states (Tables 4a, 4b) and continue on the upswing through the 
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Great Depression and into 1940. Rates begin to fall with the economic recovery 
occasioned by World War II. In Illinois the decrease in tenancy continued up to 1987 
(Table 4b). North Dakota showed a slightly different picture with the decline continuing 
only until 1974. In 1978 tenancy rates had again increased by four percentage points, 
from 13 to 17 percent (Table 4a). However, the rates remained fairly stable up to the 
1987 census. 
Table 4a. Tenure of Ownership and Average Size of Farm for North Dakota: 
1920 to 1987 
Full Part 
Year Owner Owner Tenant Manager 
1920 43.8% 29.4% 25.6% 1.1% 
1925 34.7% 30.5% 34.4% .48% 
1930 30.5% 33.7% 35.1 % .60% 
1935 30.5% 30.0% 39.2% .40% 
1940 25.2% 29.4% 45.1% .30% 
1945 31.9% 40.0% 27.8% .40% 
1950 39.0% 39.0% 21.9% .20% 
1954 38.0% 41.2% 20.4% .15% 
1959 36.0% 44.5% 18.8% .35% 
1964 36.5% 47.0% 16.1 % NA 
1969 40.5% 46.6% 14.4% NA 
1974 39.4% 47.2% 13.4% NA 
1978 34.6% 48.2% 17.2% NA 
1982 34.1% 48.8% 17.1% NA 
1987 32.4% 49.7 17.9% NA 
Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding. 
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The question with tenancy, whatever the rates, is how many tenants move into 
part-ownership or full-ownership. If the number of farmers remained the same year after 
year one could argue that declines in tenancy indicated movement of tenants up the 
ladder to part-owners or owners. However, the number of farmers in both states for 
every census period except the 1925 to 1935 period has declined therefore some of these 
tenants must be leaving the land. It is notable that in the five years after 1935, the year 
of the second highest tenancy rates in North Dakota, the state experienced the highest 
percentage decline in number of farm operators between any of the census periods under 
examination (Table 1). A similar trend occurred in Illinois although it was not quite as 
marked. 
While the proportions and numbers of tenants in each state have declined the 
proportions of part-owners have increased. In 1920 only thirteen percent of Illinois farm 
operators were part-owners but by 1987 part-owners had increased to over two-thirds 
(36.6%) of all farm operators (Table 4a). North Dakota also evidenced an increase in the 
percentage of part-owners almost as large. While North Dakota part-owners made up 
about thirty percent (29.4%) of farm operators in 1920, by 1987 they had expanded to 
form one-half (49.7%) of all operators (Table 4a). 
Rates of full ownership have moved up and down between 1920 and 1987. In 
Illinois full-ownership rates have varied from a high of 47 percent in 1974 to a low of 
38 percent in 1935. By 1987 Illinois full-owners made up almost the same proportion of 
farmers that they did in 1920 (Table 4b). In North Dakota full-ownership rates ranged 
from a high of 44 percent in 1920 to a low of 25 percent in 1940 (Table-4a). By 1987 
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full-owners formed a smaller segment of farm operators than they did in 1920. Over two-
fifths (43.8%) of farmers were full-owners in 1920 but this portion had dropped to about 
one-third (32.4%) by 1987. 
Table 4b. Tenure of Ownership and Average Size of Farm for Illinois: 1920 to 1987 
Full Part 
Year Owner Owner Tenant Manager 
1920 42.5% 13.4% 42.7% 1.40% 
1925 42.6% 14.6% 42.0% .80% 
1930 39.7% 16.2% 43.1% 1.00% 
1935 37.6% 17.2% 44.5% .80% 
1940 40.8% 15.4% 43.1% .80% 
1945 42.9% 17.3% 39.1% .80% 
1950 44.7% 20.4% 34.6% .40% 
1954 43.1% 21.8% 34.9% .30% 
1959 41.2% 25.1% 33.5% .30% 
1964 41.1% 28.2% 30.4% NA 
1969 45.8% 29.5% 25.1% NA 
1974 47.3% 31.8% 20.9% NA 
1978 43.7% 35.0% 21.5% NA 
1982 43.7% 36.7% 20.0% NA 
1987 44.0% 36.6 19.4% NA 
Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding. 
In North Dakota increases in tenancy accompany decreases in full-ownership up 
to 1940 (Table 4a). However, after 1940 decreases in full-ownership correlate closely 
with increases in part ownership while rates of tenancy continue to decrease or rise only 
slightly. If one examines percentage decreases in numbers of full owners and tenants 
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from 1945 to 1964 percentage decreases for tenants are greater than for full owners. My 
feeling is that tenants are most likely to disappear because they can no longer make a 
living off renting land. Conversely, full owners are more likely to "disappear" into the 
part-owner category. Full-owners have found it increasingly necessary to expand their 
holdings to maintain the same level of income they may have been able to attain in 
previous years with smaller amounts of land. 
However, economic times for farmers have not been good enough to allow them 
to purchase additional land outright so they have resorted to renting to increase their 
holdings. This would make sense if one considers that the value of most agricultural 
commodities has remained relatively stable in constant dollars since 1920, and for some 
commodities has actually declined, while the price of farm input materials such as fuel, 
seed, fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides, and machinery spiralled ever upward in the 
ensuing years. Of course it is impossible to say what takes place at the individual farm 
level from the grouped data of the census but the severe reductions in farm operator 
numbers do add credence to the above interpretation. 
In Illinois a somewhat different pattern of farm tenure emerges over the years. 
Where North Dakota exhibited a more wide-ranging level of full-ownership Illinois rates 
fluctuated less staying within a range of nine percent (Table 4b). The corresponding 
range of fluctuation in North Dakota was 19 percent. In addition, Illinois had higher rates 
of full-ownership than North Dakota for every census except that of 1920 (Table 4b). 
The level of full-ownership, however, held fairly steady moving up and down between 
43 and 47 percent. Conversely, Illinois part-ownership levels have been much lower than 
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those in North Dakota for every census although part-ownership rates have increased 
more noticeably in Illinois than in North Dakota since 1920. Illinois has experienced a 
steady gain in proportions of part-owners from a low of 13 percent in 1920 to a high of 
37 percent in 1987 (Table 4b). After 1940 increases in rates of part-ownership in Illinois 
correlate more closely with decreases in the incidence of tenancy. For every census after 
1940 there was an increase in part-ownership along with a decrease in tenancy rates. 
Part-ownership levels rose 19 percent and tenancy rates fell 20 percent. 
More important to look at in interpreting tenure of ownership is the proportion 
of total farm land each group farms rather than proportions of farm operators in the 
above categories. These figures provide a better idea of the size and significance of each 
group of farmers. For instance if full-owners comprise 44 percent of all farmers but only 
control 20 percent of the land in farms and part owners make up 20 percent of all 
farmers but control 40 percent of all land in farms this tells us something about the 
relative wealth and well-being of farmers of different tenure status. 
Part-owners, in this instance, would probably be better off economically than full-
owners (as a group, that is). In addition we could surmise part-owners may be attempting 
to work up to purchasing the land they now rent for their future expansion. We might 
also expect part-owners to have more heavily invested in machinery since they will need 
the aid of machines to farm their larger amounts of land. On a Chayanovian note, we 
might anticipate these family farmers to have a larger kin network available to help them 
farm their increased acres since Chayanov argues that one reason family farmers increase 
their total number of acres is to make use of under-employed kin. 
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In both North Dakota and Illinois the amount of farmland farmed by full-owners 
and tenants has declined between 1920 and 1987 whereas part-owners have increased 
their share of farmland over those years (Tables 5a and 5b). The decline in share of 
farmland has been most noticeable for full-owners with their share falling from 36 
percent to 19 percent in both states. North Dakota tenants, while also experiencing a loss 
in acres farmed did not evidence such a dramatic decline (Table 5a). Their share fell 
from 24 percent to 14 percent. Illinois tenants showed a more severe loss than full 
owners declining in share from 47 percent to 20 percent of all land in farms (Table 5b). 
Part-owners dramatically raised their portion of acres farmed expanding from 38 percent 
to 67 percent of all acres farmed in North Dakota and from 15 percent to 60 percent of 
all acres farmed in Illinois. 
Therefore, many farmers in both states have used increased size, via renting 
additional land, as a way of keeping up farm income. As the prices they receive for their 
products fail to keep up with their sky-rocketing costs of production farmers find it 
necessary to step up their levels of production just to stay even with costs. While many 
remaining farmers have increased their land holdings this has not been their only strategy 
for enlarging income. Working off their farms for neighbouring farmers or in a non-farm 
enterprise also serves as an income supplement. I tum now to patterns of off-farm work 
and their meaning for family farmers. 
Table Sa. Percentage of Acres Farmed by Tenure of Operator for North Dakota: 
1920 to 1987 
Year Full Owner Part Owner Tenants Managers 
1920 36.0% 38.1% 23.6% 2.20% 
1925 28.1% 40.4% 30.7% .79% 
1930 22.4% 46.0% 30.9% 1.00% 
1935 22.2% 44.6% 32.4% .80% 
1940 17.2% 43.7% 38.5% .64% 
1945 21.7% 54.8% 22.4% 1.10% 
1950 28.8% 52.5% 18.0% .71% 
1954 27.3% 54.5% 17.4% .83% 
1959 25.4% 58.2% 15.7% .74% 
1964 24.2% 59.2% 12.4% NA 
1969 25.4% 61.7% 12.9% NA 
1974 25.2% 64.4% 10.4% NA 
1978 22.6% 65.3% 12.1% NA 
1982 23.5% 65.6% 10.8% NA 
1987 19.2% 67.3% 13.5% NA 
Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding. 
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Working Off the Farm: Augmenting Farm Income 
One indicator of the economic status of farmers, in terms of how well their 
farming operations are doing, is to look at how many of them make an adequate living 
from farming without having to rely on off-farm income. One assumes farmers will 
choose not to work off the farm if they don't have to. In this analysis I view off-farm 
work as an occupation farmers engage in because of economic necessity rather than 
choice. Hence in years when farmers find it difficult to make ends meet because of bad 
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harvests, heavy debt, or declining commodities prices, they will seek work off-farm to 
counter reduced farm income. 
Data on off-farm work is available from 1930 to 1987 but strictly comparable 
information exists for only eight census periods: 1935, 1940, 1950, 1954, and 1974 
through 1987. According to this information it does appear farmers in Illinois and have 
increasingly engaged in off-farm work (Table 6a). In 1935 about three-quarters (76.0%) 
of all Illinois farmers worked on-farm only and slightly less than one-quarter (24.1 % ) 
of Illinois farmers worked off-farm. Only four percent worked off-farm 200 or more 
days. By 1987 less than one-half (43%) of Illinois farmers worked solely on-farm 
whereas almost one-half (49.3%) reported off-farm work. One-fifth of all farmers had 
worked off-farm less than 200 days but almost thirty percent spent 200 or more days 
working off the farm. Considering there are approximately 252 working days in the year, 
200 or more days off-farm work means these "farmers" virtually worked full-time at 
another job. 
Patterns of off-farm work in North Dakota are not as clear-cut as those in Illinois. 
From 1935 to 1987 off-farm work did increase, however, the increase was not consistent 
and reflected ups and downs in the rates (Table 6b). Interestingly enough the 1935 data 
closely corresponds to the 1987 in levels of on-farm and off-farm work. The 1935 level 
may reflect the difficult times wheat farmers experienced during the depression and 
drought of the 1930's. 
Table 6a. Percentage of Farmers Working Off-Farm by Numbers of Days 
for Illinois: 1935 to 1987 
Number of Days of Off-Farm Work 
Year None 1- 49 so -99 100 - 199 200 or more 
1935 76% 11% 4% 4% 4% 
1940 64% 10% 3% 5% 7% 
1950 63% 12% 4% 5% 13% 
1954 58% 15% 4% 5% 14% 
1974 39% 7% 3% 6% 23% 
1978 45% 10% 3% 7% 30% 
1982 43% 9% 3% 8% 28% 
1987 43% 9% 3% 8% 29% 
Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding. 
Table 6b. Percentage of Farmers Working Off-Farm by Numbers of Days for 
North Dakota: 1935 to 1987 
Number of Days of Off-Fann Work 
Year None 1- 49 so - 99 100 - 199 200 or more 
1935 57% 33% 5% 3% 2% 
1940 72% 13% 3% 2% 3% 
1950 75% 14% 3% 3% 5% 
1954 72% 14% 3% 3% 5% 
1974 49% 9% 3% 5% 9% 
1978 55% 14% 4% 7% 13% 
1982 53% 12% 4% 7% ·13% 
1987 55% 11% 4% 8% 15% 
Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding. 
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In 1935 about three-fifths (57.0%) of North Dakota farmers devoted no time to 
off-farm work while just over two-fifths (43.0%) worked off-farm. Farmers working less 
than 200 days off-farm accounted for 41 percent of all farmers and those working 200 
or more days off-farm made up only two percent of all farmers. On-farm work reached 
its high point in North Dakota in 1950 when three-quarters of all farmers reported no off-
farm work. 
In that same year about one-fifth of North Dakota farm operators worked from 
one to 199 days off-farm and five percent worked off-farm 200 or more days. By 1987 
farmers engaged solely in farm work comprised 55 percent of all North Dakota farmers 
while those working off-farm made up almost 45 percent of farmers. Slightly over one-
fifth (22.2 % ) of farmers worked less than 200 days off-farm while fifteen percent worked 
200 or more days at non-farm occupations. 
In comparison, Illinois has had larger proportions of farmers working off farm 
than has North Dakota since the 1940 census. While similar proportions of farmers fell 
into the categories between one and 199 days of off-farm work for the years between 
1940 and 1987 the share of Illinois farmers working off-farm 200 or more days has 
always exceeded that of North Dakota. In 1940 only three percent of North Dakota 
farmers worked off-farm 200 or more days compared to seven percent in Illinois. In 
1987 the comparable figures were 15 percent and 29 percent respectively. By 1987, 
therefore, Illinois had twice the proportion of farmers working close to full-time at 
another job (200 or more days off-farm work) than North Dakota had. 
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The total amount of off-farm work in numbers of days in both states does appear 
to be increasing. The proportions of farmers working 100 or more days off farm grew 
from 1940 to 1987. One group of farmers seems to be moving in the direction of 
spending from one-half a year to almost a full year on off-farm work. In 1987 farmers 
most likely to work off-farm were those with smaller values of agricultural sales. Smaller 
sales farmers were also more likely to work 100 or more days off-farm than their larger 
counterparts. The time spent in off-farm work correlated closely with the market value 
of agricultural products sold. As market value of agricultural products sold fell, days of 
off-farm work rose. Based on the above comparisons higher proportions of farmers in 
1987 in both states find it more difficult to make a living solely through agriculture. 
They use off-farm work as a strategy to augment declining farm income. 
The likelihood of engaging in off-farm work also relates to tenure of ownership. 
In 1987 part-owners were least likely to work off-farm in both states. About two-fifths 
(42.2%) of Illinois part-owners and about one third (31.0%) of North Dakota part-owners 
engaged in off-farm work. In Illinois the proportions of full owners and tenants working 
off farm were about equal standing at 52 percent and 55 percent respectively. Full 
owners in Illinois were more likely to work 200 or more days off-farm than tenants with 
37 percent of all full owners falling into this category compared to 28 percent of tenants. 
In North Dakota the situation was reversed with higher proportions of tenants (52 % ) than 
full owners (38%) working off-farm. However, full-owners and tenants were equally 
likely to work 200 or more days off farm with one-fifth (21.1 % ) in each group falling 
into this category. 
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Therefore, the data on off-farm work also suggests, as did the previous data on 
acres farmed (Table 5), that part-owners are economically better off than full owners or 
tenants in both states. They not only control more land but also find it possible to obtain 
more of their income from farming than do full owners and tenants. Of course farmers 
may engage in off-farm work out of more than dire economic necessity. However, based 
on the example of my farming relatives, off-farm work is "necessary" for two reasons: 
to improve or expand the farm and to keep their income in the middle ranges. They 
could do without it but it would mean maintaining the farm at it's present level of 
intensification and size and forgoing things like vacations, home improvements, and 
entertainment. 
Agricultural Modes of Production: 
Family Labour Farms and Farm Comorations 
Classical Marxists predict a few family farmers will expand their holdings enough 
to form a rural bourgeoisie - a class of capitalist farmers relying primarily on wage 
labour. The majority of family farmers, however, will fall into a landless state and 
become part of an emerging rural proletariat dependent on the new capitalist farmers for 
agricultural jobs. Dependency models of family farming, however, predict an incomplete 
transformation of the agricultural sector. They argue family farmers will continue to 
exist as land holders but their condition will vary depending on the state of the larger 
economy. They see family farmers as surviving in capitalist economies but as moving 
into a state of "propertied labourers" in which the farmer owns his part of his means of 
production, e.g., land and machinery, but finds his control over what to produce and 
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how to produce it eroded by the purchaser of his crop, e.g., food corporations. For 
instance, analyzes of family farmers in Wisconsin who specialize in field crops and 
vegetables suggest some of these producers give up much of the autonomy of production 
they once had because they increasingly enter into contract farming arrangements with 
agribusiness firms (Mooney 1982; Pfeffer 1982). 
To examine both the classical Marxist predictions and the "dependency" 
predictions I have analyzed data on the type of organization of farms from 1969 to 
1987. 1 Organizational information collected by the agricultural census divides farms into 
four major categories: individual (or family) farms, partnerships, corporations, and other. 
In 1978 corporations were further divided into family and non-family corporations. The 
census then partitions each corporate division into two categories: those with ten or fewer 
stockholders and those with more than ten stockholders (Tables 7a, 7b). 
If corporate farms and capitalist farms are synonymous, as Marxists assume, then 
increases in the numbers of such farms support the Marxist model of the development 
of farming in capitalist economies. While presuming corporate farms are necessarily 
capitalist farms may not be a valid assumption let us examine the data on type of farm 
organization in this vein for the time being to see how farm structure has changed over 
the past 18 years. 2 
1 Data on the number of corporate farms is not available before 1969. 
2Capitalist farms, as defined by Marxists, rely on hired labour for actual production of farm 
commodities while the owner of the farm acts as a manager, CEO, or even as an absentee 
landlord. While corporate farms of this nature do exist in the U.S. those in North Dakota and 
Illinois deviate from this model. These corporate farms follow a "working-owner" model in 
which shareholders actively participate in running the enterprise at all levels, from management 
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Looking initially at North Dakota, family farms still make up the majority of all 
farms in the state (Table 7). In 1987 almost nine-tenths (88.3%) of all North Dakota 
farms remained under family control. This represents an increase from 1969 when the 
corresponding figure stood at 85 percent. 3 The share of farmland controlled by family 
farmers during this period held steady at slightly over four fifths of all land in farms. 
Partnerships, like family farms, have remained a fairly stable proportion of all farms 
ranging from a high of 14 percent in 1969 to a low of nine percent in 1974. In 1987 
partnerships accounted for just over ten percent of all farms. The amount of land in 
farms held by partnerships decreased from 17 percent of all land in farms in 1969 to 13 
percent in 1987. 
Corporate farms have increased in number and in proportion of all farms (Table 
7a). However, the increase has been neither steady nor dramatic. In 1969 corporate 
farms made up about two tenths of one percent of all farms and accounted for four tenths 
to production. Most North Dakota and Illinois corporate farms are family corporations. From 
Drache's (1976) descriptions they seem like "overgrown" family farms where two or three 
generations of the same family collectively own the farm, work at all levels of production. Some 
have expanded and intensified to an extent where they've run out of kin to fill their labour needs 
and have had to hire "outsiders". 
3 Data on type of organization for 1969 and 1974 are not strictly comparable with data 
collected from 1978 through 1987 since 1969 and 1974 information pertains to farms with sales 
of $2,500 or more. The 1978 to 1987 data on type of organization represents all farms, 
excluding only abnormal farms. Levels of family farm organization may have been higher in 
1969 and 1974 since those farms selling less than $2,500 in agricultural products were more 
likely to be family farms than partnerships or corporations. The counts are not likely to be 
drastically different, however, since the number of farms excluded by the $2,500 qualification 
total 4,853 in 1969 and 2,049 in 1974. Assuming all these farms were family farms including 
them increases the proportion of family farms by two percent in 1969 and four tenths of one 
percent in 1974. 
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of all land in farms. Over the succeeding 18 years they increased to eight tenths of one 
percent of all farms and controlled slightly over one percent of all land in farms. Family 
corporations of less than ten shareholders comprised the vast majority of all corporate 
farms. Taken as a group North Dakota corporate farms, family and non-family, make 
up only three tenths of one percent of all corporate farms in the United States. 
Interestingly enough the "Other" category, while not significantly changing its 
proportion of farms, has shown a steady increase in land in farms. This category is a 
catch-all and includes co-operative farms, estates, trusts, agricultural research stations, 
and penitentiary farms. Between 1969 and 1987 their share of North Dakota farmland 
increased from four tenths of one percent to almost four percent (Table 7a). 
Table 7a. Percentages of Farms by Farm Organization for North Dakota: 1969 to 1987 
Corporation Corporation 
Family Non-Family 
Year Family Partnership _s.10 Shares > 10 Shares _s.10 Shares> 10 Shares Other 
1969 Farms 85.3% 14.0% .21% .020% 
Acres 82.3% 16.9% .41% .013% 
1974 Farms 90.3% 9.3% .20% *** 
Acres 82.3% 12.2% .36% *** 
1978 Farms 87.8% 11.6% .28% .010% 
Acres 81.5% 14.4% .51% .040% 
1982 Farms 86.4% 11.9% .45% .008% 
Acres 81.0% 14.4% .83% .002% 
1987 Farms 88.3% 10.5% .77% .003% 
Acres 82.1% 13.0% 1.20% na 
***: Corporate data for 1969 and 1974 groups family and non-family. 
Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding. 
*** *** .47% 
*** *** .44% 
*** *** .20% 
*** *** .25% 
.27% .005% .31% 
.04% na 3.53% 
.05% .003% .46% 
.04% na 3.75% 
.05% .003% .43% 
.04% na 3.70% 
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In Illinois, as in North Dakota, family farms continue to make up the greatest 
proportion of farms constituting 85 percent of all farms in 1987. This share has remained 
relatively stable since 1969 when family farms made up 84 percent of all farms (Table 
7b). The portion of land in farms controlled by family farmers fluctuated slightly ranging 
from a high of 84 percent in 197 4 to a lows of 78 percent in 1982 and 1987. Partnerships 
exhibited similar stability in their share of all farms ranging from 15 to 10 percent. The 
proportion of land in farms held by partnerships moved up and down between a high of 
18 percent in 1960 to a low of 14 percent in 1974. In 1987 partnerships controlled 16 
percent of all Illinois farmland. 
Table 7b. Percentages of Farms by Farm Organization for Illinois: 1969 to 1987 
Corporation Corporation 
Family Non-Family 
Year Family Partnership ~10 Shares > 10 Shares ~10 Shares > 10 Shares Other 
1969 Farms 83.8% 14.9% .53% .06% 
Acres 80.0% 18.1 % 1.10% .25% 
1974 Farms 88.9% 10.2% .60% *** 
Acres 84.3% 13.9% 1.50% *** 
1978 Farms 86.2% 12.1% 1.00% .04% 
Acres 79.6% 16.7% 2.60% .15% 
1982 Farms 85.0% 12.4% 1.60% .04% 
Acres 78.1% 16.4% 4.20% .15% 
1987 Farms 84.9% 12.0% 2.20% .03% 
Acres 78.2% 15.9% 5.00% na 
***: Corporate data for 1969 and 1974 groups family and non-family. 
Note: Percentages may not total 100.0 due to rounding. 
*** *** .74% 
*** *** .69% 
*** *** .30% 
*** *** .34% 
.15% .04% .46% 
.30% .23% .49% 
.18% .05% .67% 
.28% .19% .65% 
.17% .04% .67% 
.34% na .58% 
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Illinois does differ from the North Dakota in some aspects of farm organization. 
First, Illinois shows a greater share of farms held under corporate auspices and a 
somewhat greater ratio of farmland under corporate control (Table 7b). Three percent 
of all Illinois farms are organized as corporations and these farms account for slightly 
over five percent of all farmland in the state. Within the corporate category Illinois has 
higher proportions of non-family farm corporations than North Dakota. As a group, 
Illinois farm corporations comprise three percent of all corporate farms in the country 
compared to North Dakota's three tenths of one percent share. While Illinois has a 
slightly larger portion of "Other" farms as a percentage of all farms these farms 
constitute a smaller percentage of land in farms than do their North Dakota counterparts. 
While the proportions of corporate farms have increased over the past 18 years 
in both North Dakota and Illinois they still make up a very small segment of all farms 
in both states. Furthermore Drache's (1976) analysis of corporate family farms in the 
midwest suggests some of these farms are carryovers from large estates established as 
early as the 1880's. Most of these early capitalist farms were established by wealthy 
Eastern families who received land for their stock in the Northern Pacific Railway 
(Drache 1976: 167). They came to own huge chunks of land, much of it in the Red River 
valley, averaging between 60,000 and 80,000 acres. 
Since the agricultural census did not collect data on corporate farm organization 
until 1974 there is no statistical record of trends in farm organization. Drache (1976: 167) 
notes that 100 of these very large farms organized on a capitalist basis, e.g., operating 
for profit and employing primarily hired labour, existed during the late 1_9th and early 
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20th centuries in the Red River valley section of North Dakota and Minnesota. His 
historical analysis is confined to the valley and I have no comparable historical 
information on large farming enterprises in Illinois. 
According to Drache these farms all employed managers and the census did 
collect data on the number of farm managers from 1920 until 1959 (Tables 4a, 4b). If 
I use managed farms as a proxy for corporate farms then the percentage of corporate 
farms in North Dakota has really changed very little since 1920. In 1920 managed farms 
comprised one percent of all farms (Table 4a). In 1987 corporate farms made up eight-
tenths of one percent of all North Dakota farms. Using managed farms as a substitute for 
corporate farms in Illinois shows "capitalist" farms have increased by only one percent 
in 57 years, from slightly over one percent in 1920 (Table 4b) to just over two percent 
in 1987 (Tables 7a, 7b). 
About the loss of actual farm numbers one cannot argue. There have been 
dramatic decreases in both North Dakota and Illinois since 1920. However, the decreases 
in both states are lower than that for the country as a whole with North Dakota 
evidencing the smallest decline (Tables 7a, 7b). To argue that corporations are coming 
to dominate farm numbers in these states, however, is not warranted by the data. Instead 
individual family farmers still make up the vast majority of farmers and their share of 
all farms has shown great stability since 1920. In addition, the data on farm size by 
organization for both North Dakota and Illinois show an increase in the average size of 
family farms and partnerships but a decrease in average size of corporate farms (Table 
9). 
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Table 8. Decreases in Farm Numbers: 1920 to 1987 
1920 Farms 1987 Farms Percent Decrease 
United States 6,448,343 2,087,759 -67.6% 
North Dakota 77,690 35,289 -54.5% 
Illinois 237,181 88,786 -62.5% 
Although corporate farms only make up a small proportion of farms one should 
not judge their importance simply on the basis of numbers. As Drache (1976), Ehrensaft 
(1980), and Havens (1985) point out these farms have a significance beyond their 
numbers in that they can influence farm labour patterns, production techniques, and 
marketing methods simply because of their magnitude of production and sales. Therefore, 
these entities deserve closer examination in order to determine how they fit into the 
agricultural order and what they augur for family farming. The next section examines 
trends in hired farm labour and production methods as they relate to farm organization. 
Table 9. Average Size of Farms by Organization: 1969 to 1987 
North Dakota Family Partnership Corporation 
1969 average size 937 acres 1,173 acres 1,776 acres 
1987 average size 1,062 acres 1,423 acres 1,760 acres 
Illinois Family Partnership Corporation 
1969 average size 270 acres 344 acres 1,128 acres 
1987 average size 296 acres 425 acres 717 acres 
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Hired Farm Labour and Mechanization: 
Usin~ Live and "Dead" Labour 
Marxists predict an increase in the number of agricultural labourers (a growing 
rural proletariat) as capitalism moves into agricultural production. For them 
developments in agriculture simply mirror earlier changes in industry. If the Marxist 
model of agricultural development in capitalist countries is "correct" we should expect 
to see growing use of hired farm labourers on corporate farms. 
Sociologists following the neo-classical approach to agricultural also use an 
industrial model in speculating about farm labour. However, they foresee a heavily 
mechanized agriculture, similar to the mechanization that has taken place in American 
industry, enabling corporate farmers to lower their labour requirements and decrease 
their production costs. They stipulate that corporate farmers will try to lower their 
production costs by decreasing their need for human labour. 
The agricultural census has tracked the value of hired farm labour since 1920. 
However, the data are strictly comparable for only the 1954 to 1987 period because of 
sampling differences. A comparison of constant dollar amounts expended on farm labour 
over this 33 year period shows that there has been no trend for farmers as a group to use 
more farm labour (Table 10) in either North Dakota or Illinois. 
In North Dakota there was a $200,000 increase from 1954 to 1987. This did not 
reflect a steady increase over the years but rather an up and down movement with its 
apex in 1978. Illinois farmers actually spent less on hired farm labour in 1987 than they 
did in 1954. As with North Dakota, the value of hired farm labour evidenced no trend 
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either way, falling in one census period only to rise in the next and then drop again. The 
overall data on hired farm labour does not support the Marxist prediction of increases in 
the amount of hired labour on farms as a group. However, it is impossible to tell from 
this grouped data if increasing and decreasing dollar amounts correspond to actual 
numbers of farm workers, e.g., we have no way of knowing if, for instance, an increase 
in total dollar amount spent on hired labour represents more labourers or more labour 
by those already in the agricultural labour market. 
Table 10. Value of Hired Farm Labour in Thousands of Constant Dollars: 
1954 to 1987 
(1982-84= 100) 
Year North Dakota Illinois 
1954 $94,040 $250,619 
1959 $77,700 $245,757 
1964 $80,552 $247,232 
1969 $89,715 $247,390 
1974 $96,830 $239,694 
1978 $108,378 $293,917 
1982 $79,554 $233,724 
1987 $96,097 $242,113 
Breaking down hired farm labour by type of farm organization gives some support 
to the Marxist contention that a group of capitalist farmers relying more and more on 
agricultural wage labour is developing. These breakdowns show that corporate farms, 
whether they be family corporations or non-family corporations, do depend on greater 
amounts of hired labour than do individual/family farmers or partnerships (Tables l la, 
llb). Whether capitalist farmers employ their hired help over longer periods or whether 
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they hire more bodies cannot be deduced from the census data but they spend a greater 
proportion of all money for hired farm labour than their numbers warrant. 
While individual or family farms make up the largest percentage of farms using 
hired labour their share of the dollar amount of this labour is lower than their numbers 
would imply. Conversely, while corporate farms make up the smallest proportion of all 
farms using hired labour their share of the dollar amount of hired labour is higher than 
one would expect from their numbers. The surface interpretation would be that corporate 
farms use more hired labourers than individual family farms since these farmers spend 
more money on labour. However, this neglects the rate of pay for agricultural workers . 
• 
One could just as easily argue that greater dollar amounts spent on hired labour by 
corporate farmers simply represent higher wages paid to agricultural labourers on 
corporate farms. 
Table lla. Value of Hired Farm Labour for North Dakota by Type of Farm 
Organization: 1974 and 1987 
Type of Fann 
Individual 
Partnership 
Corporation - Total Family 
Corporation - Family ..s._10 
Shareholders 
Corporation - Total Nonfamily 


































Table llb. Value of Hired Farm Labour for Illinois by Type of Farm 
Organization: 1974 and 1987 
Type of Fann 
Individual 
Partnership 
Corporation - Total Family 
Corporation - Family .S.,10 
Shareholders 
Corporation - Total Nonfamily 



































Drache's (1976) description of midwest corporate farms suggests a combination 
of all three factors. The corporate farms he examined paid relatively good wages 
compared to wages offered in the community as a whole. In addition, corporate farmers 
did hire more workers and hired some of them for longer periods of time. This resulted 
not so much from land size but from the intensification of corporate farms through 
diversification and continuous (year-round) livestock production. Diversification meant 
corporate farmers had more irons in the fire and hence needed more people to manage 
these many enterprises. Intensification, usually through continuous livestock production 
meant they needed some workers year round instead of at peak periods of harvest only. 
Hence a 1,000 acre grain farm required less labour than a diversified, more intense 1,000 
acre grain/pasture livestock farm which, in tum, required less labour than a diversified, 
highly intense 1,000 acre grain/pasture-feedlot livestock farm. 
Although the statistical information of the census shows the agricultural 
"proletariat" has not increased in dollar value since 1954, by 1987 corporate farmers 
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were employing higher proportions of them than they were in 1954. Drache's 
observations suggest present day corporate farmers are also employing these workers at 
higher rates of pay and for longer periods of time than family farmers or farmers in 
partnerships. 
An additional factor comes into play in considering labour requirements on family 
versus corporate farms. It relates to the amount of "drudgery" farm workers are willing 
to endure. Even Drache, with his obvious preference for corporate farm organization, 
admits labour costs disadvantage corporate farmers in relation to family farmers. Early 
capitalist farmers complained hired help did not want to work the long hours or the 
intense pace of harvest schedules since they didn't have a personal stake in the farming 
operation. Family farmers, their wives, and children willingly committed to such 
conditions because their fortunes rose and fell with their farm. 
These same early capitalist farmers also lamented their inability to control the 
labour pace of hired help in unsupervised settings such as field work. Wrote one to his 
son at an Eastern college, "When one hires labor on a farm the owner has no way of 
checking up to see that they do a full day's work. It is very easy for them to shirk their 
work, lay down on a hay or straw stack and go to sleep. A man working for Henry Ford 
... has hardly time to tum around ... " (George Baldwin, quoted in Drache 1976: 187). 
Later twentieth century corporate farmers have found that by diversifying into 
controlled environment livestock operations they can confine not only the livestock, but 
also their workers, to an easily supervised area. They can also offer workers year round 
employment rather than seasonal work. Controlled livestock environments require steady 
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work rather than the hectic, intense labour of grain harvests. The largest corporate farm 
in Iowa, Garst Farms, employs 35 full-time workers year round for their beef feedlot 
operation (Drache 1976:241). All the corporate farmers Drache interviewed had invested 
· in large-scale machinery for the grain and field crop part of their operations, preferring 
to rely on the more easily controlled productive capacity of machines than of hired 
labour. 
So corporate farmers are using more hired labour than they were in 1974 but 
probably for their livestock operations rather than their grain/field crop production. For 
grain and field crop work they have invested heavily in machinery or "dead labour". At 
the time Drache interviewed mid-western corporate farmers the investment per worker 
in agriculture was $56,000 (Drache 1976:473). Larger machinery has also made family 
farmers less dependent on hiring help. Mechanization then has enabled all farmers to cut 
labour needs for grain and field crop production. However, livestock/ poultry production 
and dairying, while also becoming less labour intensive because of mechanization, still 
remain more dependent on human labour than grain/field crop production. 
Corporate farmers have influenced the production methods of grain and field crop 
farming and, through them, the use of hired labour on farms in North Dakota and 
Illinois. Twentieth century corporate family farmers like Tom Campbell in Montana, 
Roswell Garst in Iowa, Bert Hanson in North Dakota, and Frank Keine in Minnesota had 
access to more capital in their early years of farming. They put this capital to work in 
purchasing, or in one case developing, innovative machinery to cut their labour costs. 
They were the first to mechanize, on a large scale, wheat, corn, alfalfa, and potato 
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production respectively. Their increases in production both encouraged and forced other 
less wealthy farmers to adopt this machinery (Drache 1976). Those farmers who could 
not afford to keep up, at least minimally, with the mechanization innovations of these 
larger farms were increasingly marginalized. 
Therefore, corporate farmers have not only swayed production technique decisions 
for all farmers but they have also come to dominate some types of production not so 
much in terms of numbers but in terms of value of market sales. I turn now to an 
description of the type of farms associated with the production of specific agricultural 
commodities to examine dependency predictions about the evolution of family and 
corporate farms. 
High Risk and Low Return: Who's Raising What? 
Central to the argument of dependency theorists is the assertion that capitalists 
avoid certain areas of agricultural production because they are too risky or offer too low 
a return in investment. This behaviour, they believe, provides a niche for family farmers 
in capitalist economies. Family farmers are willing to take the risks and accept the low 
return inherent in the production of certain agricultural commodities because they do not 
calculate their well-being via a profit perspective. Rather they are concerned with the 
total income they can derive from their venture. Income depends to a great degree on 
how well farm families can exploit their own labour. As long as the total income they 
receive from their farm enables them to maintain an acceptable level of subsistence 
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without unacceptable levels of self-exploitation farm families will keep on farming 
regardless of their level of "profit". 
Dependency theorists have singled out grain farming, especially in the great plains 
region, as an example of an extremely high risk and low return enterprise. Hence they 
have hypothesized that this area of agricultural production would be less susceptible to 
capitalist incursions. They have also noted the high level of self-exploitation dairy 
farmers engage in and for this reason have pegged dairying as a low return production 
not attractive to capitalist operation. To test these hypotheses I have examined the types 
of commodities produced by family farmers versus corporate farmers. If, as dependency 
theorists predict, capitalists avoid high-risk, low-return enterprises corporate farms should 
concentrate in lower-risk, higher-return types of agricultural enterprises. 
We should expect North Dakota, a great plains state exhibiting some of the most 
precarious conditions in the country for agriculture, e.g., drought, early frost, insect 
plagues, and a heavy reliance on wheat production, to have fewer than average corporate 
farms. We should also find that those corporate farms existing in the state concentrate 
their production in less risky types of commodities, not wheat or other uncertain cash 
grain crops. 
Illinois has a less hazardous climate than North Dakota and hence less risk of crop 
failure due to weather conditions. In addition soil and climatic conditions favour a wider 
variety of agricultural produce than North Dakota. Hence the expectation is that Illinois 
will have more corporate farms than North Dakota and these farms will also concentrate 
on raising products whose growth is more easily controlled than cash grain crops such 
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as horticultural specialties, animal specialties, or poultry and egg products. However, 
both states should have lower proportions of corporate farms than the U.S. as a whole 
since neither area is ideal for corporate farming. 
The Census of Agriculture divides farms among ten commodities categories based 
on the value of products sold. The categories are as follows: cash grains, field crops, 
vegetables and melons, fruits and tree nuts, horticultural specialties, livestock and animal 
specialties, dairy farms, poultry and eggs, animal specialties, and general farms. The 
method used to assign farms to a group is based on the value of agricultural products 
sold. For example, farms deriving 50 percent or more of their sales from one type of 
commodity, e.g., grain, are classed as cash grain farms. Farms not deriving 50 percent 
or more from one of the specific categories are classed as general farms. Seven of the 
major categories have subdivisions, for instance, the cash grain category is divided into 
five sub-categories: wheat, rice, com, soybeans, and cash grains n.e.c. (not elsewhere 
classified). 
As noted above, Illinois and North Dakota differ in the type of agricultural 
commodities they produce. In terms of grains Illinois farmers primarily produce com and 
soybeans for their cash crops while North Dakota farmers rely overwhelmingly on wheat 
as their cash commodity with oats and barley distant seconds. In addition livestock 
operations constitute a significant portion of farms in both states with Illinois livestock 
farmers concentrating on hog raising and North Dakota farmers on cattle ranching. 
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There have been changes in the proportions of farms devoted to particular types 
of production over the time4• Illinois, however, exhibits more change than does North 
Dakota. The big change in Illinois has been the shift to more cash grain farming. In 1950 
only three tenths (31 % ) of all Illinois farms fell into the cash-grain group. This category 
continued to expand its share of all farms and in 1987 over six tenths (64%) of all farms 
were classified as cash grain farms. 
Except for a hiatus period between 1959 and 1969 livestock farms retained a 
stable share of all Illinois farms comprising about one-quarter of all farms in other census 
years. Groups showing declines were general farms, dairy farms, and poultry/egg farms. 
Of these general farms decreased the most falling from 13 percent of all farms in 1950 
to about two percent of all farms in 1987. Dairy farms dwindled from eight percent to 
three percent of all farms and poultry/egg farms, never a large group in Illinois, fell 
from about two percent to three tenths of one percent in the same period. 
In contrast, North Dakota farms showed less variation in type over the 1950 to 
1987 period. Cash grain farms remained the major farm type in North Dakota making 
up 60 percent of all farms in 1950 and 58 percent of all farms in 1987. In 1959 the 
portion of these farms did drop to 51 percent but this figure may be an artifact of the 
sampling procedure used in that year to collect data on type of farm.5 Cash grain farms' 
share of all farms rebounded by the next census when they had increased to 63 percent 
4 Data on classification of farms covers the 1950 census to the 1987 census. 
5 The 1959 numbers for North Dakota farms by type of classification ar~ not strictly 
comparable with earlier or later data because of the sampling procedure used to gather this 
information. 
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of all farms. Livestock operations increased over this 37 year period but the increase 
was not steady. In 1950 livestock operations comprised 16 percent of all farms but by 
1987 they had expanded to a 29 percent share. Field crop farms increased from one 
percent of all farms in 1950 to four percent of all farms in 1987. Dairy farms retained 
a stable share of all farms comprising four percent of all farms in 1950 and the same 
proportion in 1987. General farms declined in proportion falling from 15 percent of all 
farms in 1950 to only three percent of all farms in 1987. 
Overall then there have not been major shifts in the type of production in either 
state although there has been a movement away from generalized production to a more 
specialized kind of farming according to census categorizations of II specialized 11 • 
However, changes have occurred in the type of farms that produce certain commodities. 
Data on commodities production by type of farm organization was first collected in 1974 
and the agricultural census has continued to compile this information over the past 13 
years. This data gives a picture of the kind of commodities favoured by corporate 
farmers, farmers in partnerships, and individual farmers. 
Commodities Production of North Dakota Corporate Farms 
In 1974, almost two-fifths (38.0%) of North Dakota corporate farms specialized 
in cash grain farming, primarily wheat farming (Table 12a). About one-fifth (20.3%) of 
corporate farmers were classed as field crop farms and concentrated their production in 
either potatoes, sugar beets, or oilseeds. One quarter (25.3%) of all corporate farmers 
specialized in livestock production, primarily beef cattle. Less important corporate 
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concerns were the categories of animal specialties, horticultural specialties, general 
farms, vegetable/fruit and nut farms, and dairy farms. 
By 1987 things had changed somewhat (Table 12b). Cash grain farms grew to just 
over two-fifths (43.0%) of all corporate farms and field crops to over one-quarter 
(27.0%). Livestock farms fell to one-fifth of all corporate farms. Dairy farms increased 
their share by about two percent. Poultry and egg farms, previously non-existent in 
corporate terms, made up about one percent (1.5%) of corporate farms. General farms, 
animal specialties, horticultural specialties, and vegetable/fruit and nut farms declined. 
Table 12a. Specialty Types of 1974 North Dakota Farms Expressed as 
a Proportion of All Farms in their Organizational Category 
Fann Specialty Family Partnership Corporation Other 
Grain Farms 71.3% 67.2% 38.0% 67.1% 
Field Crops 4.2% 5.8% 20.3% 7.6% 
Livestock 14.9% 16.7% 25.3% 15.2% 
Dairy Farms 3.5% 3.8% 1.3% 1.3% 
Poultry/Egg Farms .15% .05% -- --
General Farms 5.6% 6.0% 1.3% 3.8% 
Animal Specialties .21% .08% 7.6% 1.3% 
Horticultural Specialties .07% .34% 5.1% 2.5% 
Vegetable, Fruit and Nut .01% .03% 1.3% --
Table 12b. Specialty Types of 1987 North Dakota Farms Expressed as 
a Proportion of all Farms in their Organizational Category 
Family Non-Family 
Fann Specialty Family Partnership Corporation Corporation Other 
Grain Farms 58.0% 59.0% 43.6% 35.0% 41.7% 
Field Crops 3.8% 5.5% 27.8% 15.0% 10.6% 
Livestock 29.0% 26.7% 18.0% 25.0% 34.4% 
Dairy Farms 3.8% 4.5% 2.2% 10.0% 2.0% 
Poultry/Egg Farms .3% .3% .7% 5.0% .7% 
General Farms 3.3% 2.7% 2.6% -- 9.3% 
Animal Specialties 1.6% 1.0% 3.7% 5.0% --
Horticultural Specialties .2% .1% 3.7% -- 1.3% 
Vegetable, Fruit and Nut .1 % .2% .4% -- --
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However, if we look at corporate farms as a proportion of all farms in a 
particular specialty a somewhat different picture emerges. Although two-fifths of 
corporate farms in 1974 were cash grain farms these corporate enterprises made up only 
one-tenth of one percent of all cash grain farms in North Dakota (Table 13a). Corporate 
farms made up a slightly greater proportion of field crop specialty farms comprising 
about eight tenths of one percent of these farms. Their share of livestock farms, dairy 
farms, and general farms were all under one percent. Corporate farms only had 
significant shares of farms in the categories of animal specialties ( 6. 8 % ) , horticultural 
specialties (9.3%), and vegetable/fruit and nut farms (14.3%). 
By 1987 corporate farms had increased in proportion in all classes except animal 
specialties and vegetable/fruit and nut farms. The biggest increase came in the area of 
horticultural specialty farms where corporate farms rose from a nine percent share to a 
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16 percent one (Table 13b). Their share of field crop farms rose from about one percent 
to five percent, poultry and egg farms from zero to four percent, and cash grain farms 
from one tenth of one percent to just under two percent. Shares of livestock, dairy, and 
general farms also rose but the increases were less than one percent in each category. 
Animal specialties *fell from a share of about seven percent in 1974 to a two percent 
share in 1987. Vegetable/fruit and nut farms fell from a fourteen percent share in 1974 
to a two percent share in 1987. 
Table 13a. Proportions of Types of North Dakota Farms by Production Specialty -
1974 
Fann Specialty Family Partnership Corporation Other 
Grain Farms 90.9% 8.8% .10% .18% 
Field Crops 86.6% 12.2% .88% .33% 
Livestock 89.2% 10.3% .33% .20% 
Dairy Farms 89.8% 10.0% .07% .07% 
Poultry/Egg Farms 96.5% 3.5% -- --
General Farms 90.0% 9.8% .04% .13% 
Animal Specialties 88.6% 3.4% 6.8% 1.1% 
Horticultural Specialties 55.8% 30.2% 9.3% 4.7% 
Vegetable, Fruit and Nut 71.0% 14.3% 14.3% --
The data on corporate farms in North Dakota conform in some respects to 
dependency theorists predictions about the nature of corporate farming. Greater 
proportions of these farms, as a percentage of all farms, fall into more controllable 
production categories, e.g., horticultural specialties, poultry and eggs, and field crops. 
While field crops such as potatoes, sugar beets, and oilseed crops would seem to be high 
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risk crops in a climate like that of North Dakota it appears that most of these crops are 
raised in the Red River Valley area. The valley has three advantages for those lucky 
enough to have farmland there: rich alluvial soils, higher amounts of rainfall than the rest 
of the state, and access to irrigation - a technique farmers on the high plains find difficult 
to engage in. All three factors take uncertainty out of production. 
Table 13b. Proportions of Types of North Dakota Farms by Production Specialty -
1987 
Fann Speciality Family 
Grain Farms 88.4% 
Field Crops 79.7% 
Livestock 89.2% 
Dairy Farms 87.0% 
Poultry/Egg Farms 83.2% 
General Farms 89.5% 
Animal Specialties 91.2% 
Horticultural Specialties 75.0% 


































Corporate farm production patterns in Illinois differ from those of North Dakota. 
In 1974 corporate farms' production specialties as a percentage of all corporate farms 
showed that the most important categories were cash grains, livestock, and horticultural 
specialties. Two fifths (39. 8 % ) of all corporate farms fell into the cash grain category, 
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almost one-quarter (23.0%) were classed as livestock operations, and about one-fifth 
(19.3%) were listed as horticultural specialty farms (Table 14a). 
By 1987 there had been a large increase in the proportion of corporate farms 
classed as cash grain (Table 14b). They now made up almost three fifths (59.3%) of all 
corporate farms while livestock operations fell to one fifth (19.6%) and horticultural 
specialties to one tenth (9.3%) of all corporate farms. Corporate cash grain farms 
concentrated their production in corn and soybeans while corporate livestock farms 
primarily raised hogs. 
Table 14a. Specialty Types of 1974 Illinois Farms Expressed as 
a Proportion of All Farms in their Organizational Category 
Fann Specialty Family Partnership Corporation Other 
Grain Farms 70.2% 60.5% 39.8% 78.8% 
Field Crops .52% .26% .74% .69% 
Livestock 21.7% 28.1% 23.0% 16.1% 
Dairy Farms 4.2% 7.3% 2.8% 2.1% 
Poultry/Egg Farms .47% .54% 7.6% 1.0% 
General Farms 1.4% 1.4% 1.1% .69% 
Animal Specialties .31% .15% 1.7% --
Horticultural Specialties .46% .86% 19.3% .34% 
Vegetable, Fruit and Nut .55% .56% 3.9% .34% 
Table 14b. Specialty Types of 1987 Illinois Farms Expressed as 
a Proportion of all Farms in their Organizational Category 
Family Non-Family 
Fann Specialty Family Partnership Corporation Corporation Other 
Grain Farms 64.2% 61.1% 60.4% 48.1% 72.6% 
Field Crops 1.9% 1.0% 1.4% 1.1% 2.0% 
Livestock 25.3% 27.3% 19.3% 22.5% 16.8% 
Dairy Farms 2.6% 5.9% 3.1% 2.1% 3.4% 
Poultry/Egg Farms .3% .4% .6% 3.7% .3% 
General Farms 1.8% 1.4% 1.3% 1.6% 1.4% 
Animal Specialties 2.4% 1.3% 2.8% 4.3% 1.4% 
Horticultural Specialties .5% .7% 9.3% 14.4% 1.5% 
Vegetable, Fruit and Nut 1.0% .9% 1.8% 2.1% .7% 
104 
A different view of corporate farms emerges if we look at corporate farms by 
specialty as a percentage of all farms in that specialty (Tables 15a, 15b). This vantage 
point puts corporate farms into perspective since it describes them as a part of all farms 
in the state. In 1974 corporate farms had their greatest shares in horticultural specialties, 
where they accounted for almost one-fifth (17.6%) of all farms in that category, and 
poultry and egg farms where they comprised just under one tenth (8.1 % ) of all farms 
(Table 15a). Their next largest shares of all farms were in vegetable/fruit and nut farms 
and animal specialty farms where they comprised four percent and three percent 
respectively. 
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Table 15a. Proportions of Types of Illinois Farms by Production Specialty - 1974 
Fann Specialty Family Partnership Corporation Other 
Grain Farms 90.4% 8.9% .32% .34% 
Field Crops 93.4% 5.4% .82% .17% 
Livestock 86.3% 12.9% .57% .22% 
Dairy Farms 82.8% 16.7% .34% .14% 
Poultry/Egg Farms 80.6% 10.7% 8.1% .60% 
General Farms 89.3% 10.1% .43% .15% 
Animal Specialties 91.9% 5.0% 3.0% --
Horticultural Specialties 67.7% 14.5% 17.6% .17% 
Vegetable, Fruit and Nut 86.0% 10.1% 3.8% 1.8% 
Table 15b. Proportions of Types of Illinois Farms by Production Specialty - 1987 
Family Non-Family 
Fann Specialty Family Partnership Corporation Corporation Other 
Grain Farms 85.5% 11.5% 2.1% .16% .76% 
Field Crops 90.4% 7.0% 1.8% .13% .75% 
Livestock 84.8% 12.9% 1.7% .19% .44% 
Dairy Farms 73.7% 23.2% 2.2% .15% .74% 
Poultry/Egg Farms 81.1% 12.3% 3.6% 2.3% .66% 
General Farms 87.6% 10.0% 1.7% .20% .53% 
Animal Specialties 89.6% 6.9% 2.7% .40% .40% 
Horticultural Specialties 57.8% 11.3% 25.8% 3.9% 1.3% 
Vegetable, Fruit and Nut 84.7% 10.7% 3.8% .43% .43% 
By 1987 Illinois corporate farms had increased their share of all horticultural 
specialty farms to three tenths (29.7%) of these farms (Table 15b). Their share of poultry 
and egg farms decreased to six percent while shares of vegetable/fruit and nut farms and 
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animal specialty farms remained the same. Corporate farms slightly increased their share 
of all other category by two percent or less. 
Comparison of Corporate Farms in North Dakota and Illinois 
As in North Dakota, Illinois corporate farms largest shares of all farms comprised 
less risky agricultural production such as horticultural specialties, poultry and egg farms, 
vegetable/fruit and nut farms. However, North Dakota and Illinois corporate farmers also 
differ in their production patterns. Although cash grain farms form the highest proportion 
of all corporate farms in both North Dakota and Illinois, four fifths of Illinois corporate 
farms compared to only two fifths of North Dakota corporate farms are classed as cash 
grain farms. North Dakota farmers have signifant shares of field crop production, e.g., 
potatoes, sugar beets, sunflower seeds, etc., while very few Illinois coporate farmers 
raise field crops. In addition North Dakota corporate farmers are more likely to engage 
primarily in livestock farming than Illinois corporate farmers. 
While the relatively high proportions of corporate farms concentrating on cash 
grain farming seemingly contradicts dependency predictions one has to remember that 
classification as II cash grain II means 50 percent or more of sales comes from cash grain. 
This leaves up to 50 percent of remaining sales to other agricultural commodities. 
Drache's descriptions of corporate farmers who engage in cash grain farming indicates 
these farmers have significant sales in at least one other commodity, usually livestock. 
As pointed out earlier, many of these farmers hold some of the best land in the midwest 
hence taking some of the risk out of cash grain farming. One could ·argue higher 
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proportions of lliinois corporate farmers engage in cash grain farming because Illinois 
climatic conditions make com and soybean farming less risky than North Dakota wheat 
farming. 
A more important consideration in both states, however, concerns the income 
corporate farmers derive from other sources besides sale of agricultural goods. These 
sources are many and varied. Drache's (1976) corporate farmers received non-
commodities income through agricultural supply enterprises, e.g., agricultural 
feed/seed/chemical dealerships or machinery dealerships; through agricultural service 
provision, e.g., grain drying operations, custom combining enterprises; and through cash 
income from renting out some of their vast land holdings to neighbouring farmers. 
Drache's corporate farmers had also moved to increase their income from cash 
grain by regaining control over the marketing of it. As pointed out previously, some of 
them have their own elevators, rail sidings, and even grain agents. In addition, their 
larger volume of production and alternate sources of income mean they can hold their 
grain until market highs thereby selling for the best price. Smaller farmers don't have 
this advantage. Generally they are so financially stretched over the production period they 
must sell most or all of their crop at harvest to pay accumulated bills. 
Therefore, dependency theorists predictions about capitalist farmers avoiding high-
risk commodities would apply only if family farmers and corporate farmers produced 
under equal natural and market conditions. From what Drache has described the 
circumstances of corporate farmers differ markedly from family farmers. In terms of 
natural conditions many midwestem farmers have better land and better climatic 
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conditions than the average family farmer. In addition the nature of marketing 
agricultural commodities in the United States, a system without any marketing boards, 
gives the advantage to farmers who can control, somewhat, the marketing of their 
produce. In the midwest it is corporate farmers who have greater marketing control since 
they have enough capital to invest in direct marketing and enough alternate income to 
wait for the best price before selling grain. 
Smaller farmers have attempted to control grain marketing through co-operative 
grain buying and marketing organizations. The most successful of these co-operative 
endeavours came about in North Dakota in the late teens and early twenties when the 
Non-Partisan League established producer owned elevators and lake-head grain terminals 
along with a farmers' grain marketing company. The Non-Partisan League arrangements 
prospered until the combined opposition of the major grain companies and the federal 
government, through the efforts of its newly established Farm Bureau, finally 
undermined the co-operative through boycotting its products on the Minneapolis grain 
exchanges and outright Farm Bureau threats to farmers involved with the League (Russell 
1975; Saloutus and Hicks 1951). 
Because of a somewhat friendlier political environment, a tradition of co-operation 
on the part of farmers, and a weaker grain merchant establishment western Canadian 
grain producer co-operatives, established about the same time as the Non-Partisan League 
enterprises, established a firm and lasting base. They still exist today and their early 
members were instrumental in founding the Canadian Wheat Board. 
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The Wheat Board, through its quota system and price averaging, gives smaller 
grain farmers better prices than they would ever get in an uncontrolled market economy. 
All farmers are subject to Wheat Board quotas - at any one time no farmer, no matter 
what his/her volume, can sell more than the established quota for that period. All farmers 
receive the same price per bushel. The Board determines the price by averaging the 
prices it has received for wheat sales ( on a national level) during the year. This takes 
away any advantage of holding grain until market highs since the farmers would receive 
the average price for it no matter when it was sold. Hence every farmer makes the same 
amount per bushel. By averaging market highs and lows the Wheat Board negates the 
disadvantage of being forced to sell at market lows, which many smaller farmers have 
to do because they are cash poor by the end of harvest. The Wheat Board then acts as 
an equalizer between all sizes of farmers at the marketing level. Although I have no data 
on Canadian farm numbers and organization it's my guess that there would be less reason 
to produce on the scale of corporate farms in the U.S. midwest since the Wheat Board 
takes away the marketing advantages of large scale production. 
Summing Up: The Overall Picture 
The overall picture of agriculture in North Dakota and Illinois based on the 
previous descriptions of segments of farming in both states from 1920 to 1987 is one of 
change in some areas but of stability in others. Looking at changes first, today each state 
has far fewer farmers than it did in 1920 and those farmers still in business operate farms 
over twice as large as the average 1920 farm. While the decreases in farm numbers in 
110 
both states have been substantial since 1974 each state experienced higher percentage 
declines in farm numbers during the 1950's and 1960's. 
In terms of ownership of farms, by 1987 farmers in both states were more likely 
to be part owners than they were in 1920. One-half of North Dakota farmers and one-
third of Illinois farmers were part owners, representing a 20 percent increase in part-
ownership levels in each state over the 67 year period. Tenancy rates decreased in each 
state but more noticeably in Illinois than in North Dakota. 
The amount of off-farm work increased in both states. Today's farmers are more 
likely to work off-farm and are also more likely to be employed virtually full-time in off-
farm work than their 1920 counterparts. However, Illinois farmers showed higher rates 
of off-farm work than North Dakota farmers. Not surprisingly, farmers with smaller 
values of agricultural sales show higher levels of off-farm work. In addition, full-owners 
and tenants work off-farm more than part-owners. 
In 1987, as in 1920, farms in both states remain predominantly organized along 
family lines. Over four-fifths of all farms in each state are family farms. Corporate farms 
make up only a tiny proportion of all farms in each state although Illinois has higher 
proportions of these farms than North Dakota. Furthermore, most corporate farms in 
North Dakota and Illinois are family corporations with less than ten shareholders. Non-
family corporate farms form a miniscule segment of all farms in both states. While the 
percentage of Illinois corporate farms closely approximates that of the United States as 
a whole, North Dakota's proportions fall under the national level. 
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Corporate farms differ from family farms in the amount of hired labour they use 
and in the commodities they produce. Corporate farmers use higher proportions of hired 
labour than family farmers. Dollar amounts of hired labour have remained stable since 
1950. However, from 1974 to 1987 the distribution of labour changed. In 1987 corporate 
farmers hired a much larger share of agricultural labour than they had in 1974. Shares 
for family farmers and partnerships dropped. 
In terms of commodities production corporate farmers concentrate their production 
more heavily in "controllable" commodities than family farmers. For instance, corporate 
farmers are more likely to produce poultry and eggs, horticultural specialties, vegetables, 
or fruit and/or nuts than family farmers. In North Dakota corporate farmers also show 
a greater propensity than family farmers to raise field crops like potatoes and sugar beets 
and to concentrate on livestock production. 
CAN WE KEEP THEM DOWN ON THE FARM? FUTURE PROSPECTS 
FOR AMERICAN FAMILY FARMERS 
Of the three models used to explain agricultural development in capitalist 
economies, the Chayanovian/dependency model best accounts for the changes in 
agriculture in the two states I have examined. However, even this model fails to 
illuminate some aspects of farming in North Dakota. In this concluding chapter I outline 
the strengths of the dependency model as it applies to my data and point out some of its 
deficiencies. I also examine future prospects for American farmers in light of the current 
state of American agriculture. 
Who's Still Out There?: 
Numbers, Or~anization, and Specialization 
From the data on farm numbers it's abundantly clear that both North Dakota and 
Illinois, like the United States as a whole, have lost tremendous numbers of farmers since 
1920. All three models predict this so in this respect neither of them lose credibility. 
However, decline has been differential. Neither North Dakota or Illinois have suffered 
as high a loss as the nation. Of the two states North Dakota evidenced the smallest 
decrease in farm numbers. The dependency model is the only one that hints of 
differential decline. Chayanov argued different ecological and conditions, e.g., climate, 
soils, crops produced, and organizational conditions, e.g., labour power based on family 
units as opposed to labour power based on hired labour, lead to different rates of change 
in peasant and capitalist farm numbers. I tum now to possible explanations of lower farm 
number decline in North Dakota. 
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Fann Tenacity and Lifestyle: Willingness to Engage in Drudgery? 
It is somewhat surprising, based on the statistics for farm production expenses and 
market value of farm sales, that North Dakota had a lower rate of farm loss than Illinois. 
From 1969 to 1987 North Dakota farmers had lower average values of sales and higher 
average production costs than Illinois farmers. Given these statistics I would have 
expected a higher rate of farm loss in Illinois. However, these statistics are averages and 
necessarily obscure any variations among farms. It may be that the majority of North 
Dakota farms have lower production costs than Illinois farms but a significant minority 
have very high production costs and hence skew the average. 
Other explanations besides statistical ones, however, come to mind. With the 
industrial base in Illinois, farmers may have more opportunity for alternative 
employment. Hence they may be less willing to stick with a relatively low paying farm 
when they can get a higher paying industrial job. North Dakota has far fewer non-farm 
employment opportunities. Approaching this apparent contradiction from a Chayanovian 
perspective leads to a consideration of the farm family itself in terms of how it regulates 
its consumption levels and allocates its labour power. It may be that North Dakota farm 
families are more frugal than Illinois farmers in their personal consumption habits 
thereby balancing lower sales and higher production costs with reduced personal 
consumption. 
Still another factor involves the work of other family members besides the farmer 
since we are after all examining a family, rather than an individual, labour unit. I refer 
specifically to the work of farm wives. It would help to know what percentages of farm 
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wives in each state work off-farm not only to discover proportional differences in this 
work, if any, but also to compare tenure of employment and rate of pay. I know my 
cousins would have to reduce their personal consumption levels if their wives quit 
working in town. All work full-time at lower middle-income, white-collar jobs. In the 
area where my cousins live only one farm wife out of ten families does not work full-
time off the farm. Yet I know of no wives of the previous generation in that area who 
worked off the farm. 
On the other hand, perhaps North Dakota farmers have other sources of farm-
related income Illinois farmers don't rely on. The 1987 statistics on other farm-related 
income show higher percentages of North Dakota farmers receiving income from gross 
cash rent or share payments and other (non-specified) farm-related income sources. 
Similar proportions of Illinois and North Dakota farmers received money from custom-
work and other agricultural services (twelve percent and eleven percent respectively). 
State Support for Agriculture: Government Payments 
The biggest difference in other farm-related income between Illinois and North 
Dakota farmers was in government payments. In North Dakota 36 percent of all farmers 
received government payments while in Illinois the corresponding proportion was 24 
percent. North Dakota farmers also received higher average payments than Illinois 
farmers. Of all those farmers eligible for government payments in North Dakota, the 
average payment was $17,900 while in Illinois it was $15,688. If all government 
payments are averaged over all farmers in each state North Dakota still comes out ahead 
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with an average payment of $13,730 compared to an Illinois figure of $9,927. Of course 
some of this difference may be due simply to the production levels of farms. For 
instance, if North Dakota farmers, on average, produce more than Illinois farmers, then 
they would be eligible for more subsidy payments, if, as I understand it, U.S. 
agricultural subsidies are basically price supports and guarantee farmers a specific price 
per unit of a specific commodity. 
While family farmers in both states made up the highest proportion of farmers 
receiving government payments, partnerships and corporations, relative to their 
percentage of all farms receiving payments, got a higher share of transfer dollars than 
their numbers warrant. For instance, in North Dakota corporations made up only eight-
tenths of one percent of all farms receiving government payments but they received 
almost two percent of government payment dollars. Partnerships accounted for 11 percent 
of all farms receiving government payments but garnered almost 15 percent of all 
payments. This translates into an average government payment of $37,542 to each 
corporate farm, $23,806 to each partnership, but only $17,014 to each family farm 
collecting payments. The situation is similar in Illinois with the corresponding figures at 
$35,818, $20,332, and $14,385. Again, the grouped census data obscures whether or not 
government payments are fairly evenly distributed within these three farm classes or if 
their distribution is irregular. Vogeler (1978) and Hightower (1978) argue the richest 
U.S. farmers (those with highest sales) receive the lion's share of government payments 
to agriculture. Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times (1978) researchers assigned about 80 percent 
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of all government payments to the top 20 percent of income-recipients in agriculture in 
the United States. 
The data on agricultural subsidies points out a major deficiency in all three 
models I have examined. Each neglects the role of the state in the development of 
agriculture. While I can understand why Chayanov, Lenin, and early 19th century 
economists failed to see the state as a major player in the agricultural arena, subsequent 
researchers, especially those discussing the development of agriculture after WWII, must 
necessarily take account of state "incursions" into the agricultural arena. Hightower 
(1978) is one of the few recent researchers to undertake a detailed study of one aspect 
of state intervention in American agriculture. He examines the role of agricultural land 
grant colleges in promoting "big business" approaches to farming in the U.S. He 
convincingly shows how these institutions, originally established to aid family farmers 
and improve rural living conditions, became the tools of agribusiness rather than resource 
centres for small, independent farmers. 
Rural sociologists need to conduct analyses of state agricultural policy in terms 
of the effects of government price supports, government credit schemes for farmers, and 
agricultural export policy on the structure of agriculture. We need to know who benefits 
the most from such state policy and whether or not such policies promote or discourage 
specific types of farm organization, e.g., corporate as opposed to family organization. 
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Who's Mindin~ the Farm? 
The prevailing perception of the farm crisis in the mid-west portrays family 
farmers as the chief victims of foreclosures. While this is true at a numbers level it is 
also slightly misleading. The data for North Dakota and Illinois suggest that other types 
of farm organizations, e.g., corporations, may be as susceptible to business failure as 
family farms. The proportion of family farmers has remained stable in both states since 
1920. If managed farms can be legitimately used as proxies for corporate farms then 
"corporate farms" share of all farms has also remained stable. This suggests that family 
and corporate farmers may be equally likely to "fail" in these states. Drache (1976) gives 
a number of examples of capitalist farm failures in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
in North Dakota, Minnesota, and Iowa. 
If family farms and capitalist farms go out of business at much the same rate then 
this calls into question both Marxist and neo-classical models of the development of 
agriculture in capitalist societies. Marxist arguments about the inability of the agricultural 
petty bourgeoisie to survive advanced capitalism need rethinking since the "petty 
bourgeoisie" still command by far the largest share of all farms in both North Dakota and 
Illinois. However, the Marxist argument of monopolistic tendencies with advanced 
capitalism is supported by drastically declining numbers of producers. 
Neo-classical economists who argue corporate, capitalist organization is the most 
"efficient" way to produce agricultural commodities also appear to be in error since their 
corporate enterprises fare no better than family farm organizations in terms of 
proportional survival. Even though Drache's corporate farmers have many advantages 
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family farmers don't have, e.g., lower costs of input because of bulk buying, higher 
prices for goods because of more market control, and in many cases, more fertile land 
and better climatic conditions, they seem to be subject to rates of failure approximating 
that of family farmers. 
What has happened to both types of farms is a reduction in their numbers and, 
at least with family farms, a major increase in size. There are monopolistic trends at 
work here and they closely parallel traditional Marxist explanations for monopoly 
developments in the industrial sector. Increases in the size of family farms have been 
made possible by mechanization of much farm labour. So farmers, like businessmen, 
have replaced live labour with dead. One Illinois or North Dakota farm family, with the 
aid of machines, can now manage a farm two and one-half times as large as the farm one 
family could work in 1920. 
Rationale for Mechanization 
While farm machinery has greatly reduced the labour intensive nature of 
agriculture in the United States it has greatly increased it's capital intensive character. 
However the reasons for such mechanization are slightly more complicated than the 
Marxist argument of competition through mechanization. It may be that capitalist farmers 
initially provided the market for much of this machinery and family farmers adopted the 
technology as quickly as their pocketbooks would let them so compete effectively with 
other mechanized farmers. However, the two world wars and heavy European 
immigration to large American cities also promoted mechanization. World War I and 
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World War II occasioned agricultural labour shortages and increased demand for 
agricultural commodities abroad. At the same time massive immigration to the United 
States swelled the urban population and increased the demand for food within the 
country. Farmers had expanding markets and few helpers so they turned to machines. to 
increase their production levels. 
Mechanization then initially enabled family farmers to produce as much or more 
on their farms without the amount of hired labour they previously had to rely on during 
busy seasons. In the long run it also made it possible for a single farm family to handle 
larger and larger numbers of acres on their own. Additional farm input materials such 
as pesticides, herbicides, commercial fertilizers, and hybrid seeds also increased 
production levels after World War II. The tremendous increase in acreage for the average 
farm in both North Dakota and Illinois is in part a result of these technological changes. 
However, mechanization began a "technological treadmill" for farmers. By 
tremendously increasing productive levels it kept prices for agricultural commodities low 
both during and after World War II. At the same time farm input prices kept rising. 
Machinery, and fuel, and later pesticides, herbicides, fertilizer, and seeds all escalated 
in price after farmers began using them and have continued to do so since WW II. Hence 
farmers also got larger just to keep their income levels stable. 
Hightower (1978) also documents land grant college "advice" to farmers to 
mechanize. U.S. land grant colleges have encouraged family farmers to "over-equip" 
their operations but unfortunately have done little to create machinery suitable for small 
and medium scale farming (Hightower 1978:37). Land grant colleges have instead busily 
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designing machinery modelled for very large acreages. At the time Hightower gathered 
his data (the early 1970's) he estimated the mechanization research of land grant colleges 
served only the largest-scale producers and was actually harmful to the majority of 
independent producers, even those producers who had sales over $100,000 (Hightower 
1978:36). Yet land grant colleges pushed this type of mechanization as a necessity and 
developed no alternative technology for smaller farms. 
Therefore American farmers' current reliance on agricultural machinery is 
contingent upon a unique set of historical circumstances: agricultural labour shortages 
occasioned by two world wars, the development of a class of large-scale producers, 
continuing low commodities prices, and state supported research institutions which 
encouraged all farmers to equip their operations with as much machinery as possible. The 
result has been far fewer farms than in the past and far larger farms. While Marxist and 
neo-classical economic theories correctly identify the move toward fewer and larger 
farms they ignore the historical contingencies making this development possible. For 
instance, if the Civil War, two world wars, and the Korean War would not have occurred 
agriculture may have taken a completely different course of development. Similarly, if 
agribusiness did not have the ear of land-grant colleges farmers may have not have been 
encouraged to adopt mechanical and chemical inputs to the extent they now have. 
Both Marxists and neo-classical economists posit "laws" of agricultural 
development given a capitalist economy and ignore other impinging systems such as the 
political situations within countries and throughout the world at any given time. Hence 
their discussions of agriculture and its development generally ignore the effects of 
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national and international political events on the agricultural sector. Some research in the 
dependency vein, most notably that of Mann and Dickinson (1980), documents the unique 
history of American agriculture. They attempt to show the inter-relationships between 
U.S. internal military security (subduing American Indian tribes and securing the Spanish 
southwest) and agricultural policy and expansion. The history of mechanization again 
illustrates the crucial role the state plays in agricultural development either indirectly, 
through its political alliances, or directly through its pressure on farmers to contribute 
to national development by adopting specific production methods, e.g., mechanized to 
increase the food supply. 
Characteristics of the Mechanized Fanner 
While Marxists and neo-classical economists predict a size polarization among 
farmers this has not, as yet, occurred in either state. Rather most farmers remaining in 
production have grown larger. The modal size category for farmers in both states is now 
three size categories larger than it was in 1920. However, there is now less concentration 
in particular size categories than in 1920. For instance, the 1987 modal size category for 
Illinois contains 30 percent of all farmers compared to 56 percent in 1920. The 1987 
modal size category for North Dakota accounts for 28 percent of all farmers but in 1920 
the modal category contained 54 percent of all farms. So this "spreading out" of farmers 
among size categories may indicate a polarization trend. 
In addition there are growth differentials between family farms, partnerships, and 
corporate farms. While family farms and partnerships have increased in size since 1969 
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corporate farms, as a group, have actually become smaller on average. The fact that 
corporate farms have lost acres since 1969 suggests two things: corporations are relying 
on vertical integration to maintain profitability and/or corporations are concentrating in 
commodities using less land, e.g., poultry and egg production. According to Drache's 
data both things are happening. Hightower documents the highest levels of vertical 
integration in agriculture in the poultry broiler industry and adds that agribusiness 
companies such as Ralston Purina are pushing for vertical integration of the hog industry 
(1978:43). 
What seems to be happening is that corporate producers are coming to dominate 
the production of commodities that lend themselves well to vertical integration and that 
actual physical size of farms is not a good indicator of the importance of a farm. These 
"dominated" commodities tend to fall into the "low risk" category of agricultural 
produce. This finding supports the contentions of dependency theorists who argue high 
risk sectors will be left to independent producers and low risk sectors will increasingly 
come under the purview of corporate producers. 
This leaves high-risk commodities production primarily to family farmers. High-
risk commodities also tend to bring lower returns in the market place, e.g, wheat as 
opposed to potatoes, and hence farmers relying on production of such products probably 
are under more pressure to increase their volume to keep up with rising costs. This may 
account for much of the size increase in family farms. Rather than vertically integrating, 
family farmers are relying on increased production through larger size to keep up their 
farm income. 
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Dependency theorists, however, do not go far enough in their analysis of lower 
risk commodities. They argue low-risk commodities fall under the sway of corporate 
producers because of the nature of the commodity, e.g., the commodity has inherent 
qualities that make it easy to raise. They ignore the active efforts of corporate farmers 
and agribusiness firms to create less-risky commodities or less risky environments for 
producing commodities. For assistance in this endeavour corporate agriculturalists have 
turned to researchers at land grant colleges. The researchers have obliged their requests 
and concocted harder varieties of fruits and vegetables that incur less damage from 
mechanical harvesting; come up with Ethylene, a chemical used to artificially ripen fruit 
and vegetables picked "green" by these same mechanical harvesters; and pioneered the 
use of the growth hormone DES (diethylstilbestrol) for cattle to speed up the 
"maturation" rate of feedlot animals (Hightower 1978:47-50). 
Even though land grant college research is primarily funded by tax dollars most 
of it benefits neither the consumer nor the independent family farmer. In general most 
land grant college research results in poorer quality products in terms of taste and 
nutrition. In the case of DES it may actually create serious health risks for the public. 
The primary beneficiaries are agribusiness interests who get their research done for 
nothing and market the "innovations" at profitable prices. Therefore, land grant colleges 
have speeded-up, and in some cases made possible, corporate production of agricultural 
commodities. None of the models I examine take account of the political power structure 
that makes possible such use of public funds raised by government taxation for the 
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primary benefit of one small segment of the agricultural sector at the expense of family 
farmers and consumers. 
Part-Time Farmers 
Both the Marxist and dependency models predict increases in farmers' off-farm 
work levels with advanced capitalism but for different reasons. Marxist view these 
increases as evidence farmers' loosening grip on their land. The result is inevitable - off-
farm work eventually leads to total absorption into the industrial or rural proletariat as 
the farmer finds he can no longer afford to keep his land. 
Dependency theorists see off-farm work in two ways: as a survival strategy that 
farmers use to get through tough economic times and then abandon when times get 
better; and as a way of fully utilizing all the labour power available on the farm, e.g., 
if the farm does not require all one's attention then labour power is expended in another 
area that brings in income. 
Given the lack of data on who works off-farm and why an evaluation of the 
Marxist and dependency evaluations is not possible. Some speculation, however, is in 
order. 
If off-farm work patterns are any indication of "commitment" to farm labour then 
North Dakota farmers, whether out of choice or lack of alternative, do spend less time 
working away from the farm than Illinois farmers. Obviously, Illinois farmers, if they 
need or want to work off-farm, have more opportunity to find alternative employment 
because of Illinois' industrial base. North Dakota farmers don't have the same 
125 
opportunities. This may mean they are cash poor and hence have shied away from 
agricultural "consumerism" in the form of machinery, vehicles, and other farm inputs. 
Less heavy reliance on inputs in turn means farmers would be less affected by the cost-
price squeeze of escalating input prices and stagnant commodities prices. 
The 1987 data on farm production expenses, however, shows North Dakota 
farmers, on average, spent more on fertilizer, fuel, herbicides, and pesticides than Illinois 
farmers. They also had higher interest payments. While I have no data that breaks down 
expenses by size or sales of farm such analysis on inputs for both states is clearly needed 
if we hope to understand farming strategies and differential rates of farm loss1• 
Whatever the reasons for the difference 30 percent of Illinois farmers today are 
really farming in their spare time, whereas only 15 percent of North Dakota farmers 
spend this much time in off-farm work. These farmers generally have lower than average 
agricultural sales and spend 200 or more days in the year working off the farm. 
Unfortunately we're not sure who these farmers are in terms of other characteristics. It 
would help to know their ages, the number of years they had farmed, their marital status, 
and their production specialties. 
1 These farm production expenses include: commercial fertilizer, petroleum products, 
agricultural chemicals, interest expense, hired farm labour, feed for livestock and poultry, and 
livestock and poultry purchased. The largest categories of expenditures for North Dakota are in 
order of size: interest (12 % ), fertilizer (10% ), petroleum products (10% ), agricultural chemicals 
(8%), livestock and poultry purchased (7%), hired farm labour (5%), and feed for livestock and 
poultry (4%) [totals 56% of all farm production expenses]. The largest categories of 
expenditures for Illinois are in order of size: fertilizer (12%), livestock and poultry purchased 
(10%), feed for livestock and poultry (10%), interest (10%), agricultural che~icals (7%), 
petroleum products (7%), and hired farm labour (6%) [totals 62% of all farm production 
expenses]. 
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would help to know their ages, the number of years they had farmed, their marital status, 
and their production specialties. 
For instance, if these farmers are young and just starting out one would interpret 
the off-farm work in a more positive light, e.g., working to get established. However, 
if these farmers have been in business for some years and are now resorting to off-farm 
work the prognosis would be less rosy. One might surmise they worked off-farm to meet 
more basic needs rather then to build-up the farm. A more neutral interpretation is that 
farmers work-off farm do so to increase their income, not out of necessity to keep the 
farm going, but because of a desire for money for extras. 
Future Prospects for American Farmers 
Given the historical record and the information on the current situation of 
American farmers what can one say about the future prospects for family farmers in the 
U.S.? I think they will continue to exist albeit in a different way than the family farmers 
of the past. Although dependency farmers are pessimistic about the ability of family 
farmers to resist the control of agribusiness through contract farming, and the control of 
banks, through indebtedness there may be light at the end of the tunnel. There are 
historical precedents and other recent, although non-American, research that indicates 
somewhat different prospects for family farmers than that of either "semi-
proletarianization" or "propertied labourers". 
Recent trends in the structure of agricultural production and the numbers of farm 
foreclosures certainly present a gloomy picture of family farming although dependency 
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theorists do present sound reasons for the continued existence of small, marginalized 
farmers. The "cost-price" squeeze and recurring overproduction crises in agriculture have 
pushed "less competitive farmers", for want of better terms, out of business. However, 
a number of questions about agricultural development need to be examined before 
researchers write family farmers off as destined for extinction or for significantly 
degraded socio-economic status. 
In the first place, researchers haven't analyzed which farmers are getting bigger 
or how they are getting bigger and which farmers are getting smaller. Both traditional 
Marxists and dependency theorists assume the bigger farmers are necessarily capitalist 
farmers, meaning they primarily rely on wage workers to do most of the farm work. If, 
as they claim, the increasing number of larger farmers rely more and more on wage 
labour then one might expect to see an increasing number of agricultural wage workers 
in areas where family farming once prevailed. But this has not been empirically 
demonstrated. No researcher has yet looked closely at agricultural wage work on the 
national level let alone at the regional level. 
Although Pfeffer (1985a) argues that many part-time farmers engage in 
agricultural wage labour for neighbouring farmers this is not so very different from the 
"hired hands" of homesteading days who worked for more established (older) farmers 
while at the same time farming their own land. This practice enabled them to put money 
away to eventually buy more land. Therefore, part-time farming can also be viewed as 
the road to full-ownership and full-time farming rather than a downward movement 
towards the status of "propertied" labourer. 
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The process by which larger farmers have consolidated their holdings and 
continue to maintain viable operations also remains poorly understood. In terms of those 
farmers who get larger, Marsden's (1982) data on British family farmers in North 
Humberside indicates a "cannabilization" process in action. Wealthier farmers buy out 
their less well-off neighbours in two situations: when they go out of business because of 
foreclosures or when neighbouring farmers who have no heirs put their farm up for sale 
so they can retire. However, Marsden's data also indicates the importance of kin 
networks in farming and shows that in North Humberside the farmers who are most 
successful, at least in terms of size, are not corporate farmers but those family farmers 
who have extensive kin resources to help them farm. 
The kin-network farming operation in North Humberside functioned with a 
"collective" ethic in which family members committed themselves to maintain the 
predominance of the family by continuing and expanding the farming enterprise. These 
farming endeavours succeeded because the "collective" attitude of families promotes the 
sharing of capital resources, technical skills, and managerial abilities (Marsden 
1984:218). Sharing resources allowed such kin-based enterprises to increase their 
superiority on the "treadmill of increasing farm size and capital investment" (Marsden 
1984:218). They gained an advantage not only over small, "kin-isolated", farmers but 
also over non-farm capitalists who try to enter the farming business without the collective 
ethic and kin-based resources. 
In North Humberside, then, strong family and kinship ties were the most 
important factor in maintaining farm success. Kin networks provided the mechanism by 
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which a class of large-scale, "family" farmers emerge. Lack of supporting kin-networks 
explained the "marginalized" status of small farmers and the absence of capitalist farms 
owned by non-family corporations. The extent to which this process may be occurring 
in the U.S. is a subject for future research. Farm ownership data for the U.S. does show 
that individuals and family corporations own the majority oflarge farms in the U.S., not 
non-family corporations (U.S. Agricultural Census 1987). This suggests that a similar 
process could be occurring here. 
The family farms Marsden identifies may be no more in the best interests of 
consumers or the farm community than non-family corporate farms. Such developments, 
however, must lead us to ask new questions about increasing farm size and the types of 
organization associated with it. 
In addition to the lack of knowledge about which farmers get bigger, neo-classical 
economics and Marxist models assume agriculture in capitalist economies follows a linear 
developmental course. The movement is from small farms to large ones, from many 
individually-owned farms to only a few, corporate-owned farms, and from unmechanized 
farms to highly mechanized farms. Historical analyzes of agricultural development 
suggest a non-linear pattern. Newby' s (1978) historical examination of British agriculture 
shows suggests that agriculture can move from family farming to capitalist farming, and 
then back to family farming again, depending on the price of land, the return on 
investment in land, and the price of agricultural commodities, to mention only a few 
factors. Similarly, high levels of mechanization are not only associated with capitalist 
farms. In some cases capitalist farms are less mechanized than family farms. 
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Mechanization may promote the maintenance of family farms in that machines enable 
individual farmers to do all their farm labour on their own without hiring help. 
A further factor operating in the agrarian sector is the movement towards an 
energy-efficient, environ mentally sound agriculture. "Sustainable agriculture" has become 
a buzz-word for environmentalists, concerned farmers, and green consumers. The extent 
to which the demand for organically grown foodstuffs will influence the structure of 
agriculture remains to be seen. Given that such produce requires intensive rather than 
large-scale production a demand for it could give family farmers a shot in the arm. 
It could lessen their dependence on agribusiness input industries for chemicals, 
machinery, and fuel. Chemical inputs for farming such as herbicides, pesticides and 
chemical fertilizer would no longer be used. Instead farmers would concentrate on cover 
crops to control weed growth, lessen soil erosion, and provide green manure for their 
fields. In turn, this type of farming would promote smaller-scale farming operations 
thereby getting rid of the need for large-scale machinery and fossil fuels. Farmers could 
instead concentrate on quality products and increasing production through soil 
improvement. However, I don't believe green demand alone will be enough to totally 
restructure agriculture in America. This is where the state could play a role through 
environmental legislation to promote "environmentally friendly agriculture". 
Whatever the agricultural result of green demand I would argue that agriculture, 
as it is now practiced in this country, is in danger of environmental collapse. We use too 
much energy to produce too little food. We have compromised our seed bases by too 
great a reliance on too few hybrids. Soil degradation is a continuing problem. Large 
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machinery like four-wheel drive tractors compacts soil, irrigation causes soil salinity and 
depletes groundwater resources, and chemical fertilizers in no way make up for the more 
complex nutrients provided by cover crops and animal manure. 
Family farmers seem the most likely to switch to sustainable agriculture simply 
because they have the most to gain from it. It would alleviate their input-cost pressures 
and might allow them greater control over marketing if they dealt through green 
consumer networks like food co-ops and sustainable agriculture networks. The extent to 
which family farmers can take advantage of the increasing organic produce demand and 
organize themselves as sustainable agriculturalists may be a key factor in their survival 
in the American economy. 
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